Strieff, ___ US ___, 136 SC 2056, ___ LE2 ___ (16) #14–1373:
Narcotics detective, Fackrell, conducted surveillance on a South Salt Lake City residence based on an anonymous tip about drug activity. The number of people he observed making brief visits to the house over the course of a week made him suspicious that the occupants were dealing drugs. After observing Strieff leave the residence, Fackrell detained Strieff at a parking lot, identifying himself and asking Strieff what he was doing at the house. He then requested Strieff’s identification and relayed the information to a police dispatcher, who informed him that Strieff had an outstanding arrest warrant for a traffic violation. Fackrell arrested Strieff, searched him, and found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Strieff moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that it was derived from an unlawful investigatory stop. The trial court denied the motion, and the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, however, and ordered the evidence suppressed.
The United States Supreme Court holds that while the investigatory stop was unlawful, the . The discovery of the warrant was sufficiently “attenuated” that a search incident to arrest was valid.
According to Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, the attenuation exception is as follows:
Evidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that “the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.”
The opinion then analyzes in detail the “three factors” explicated in Brown v. Illinois, 422 US.590 (1975). Prosecution wins.
Much to the displeasure of Justice Sotomayor, who wrote in dissent:
The Court today holds that the discovery of a warrant for an unpaid parking ticket will forgive a police officer’s violation of your Fourth Amendment rights. Do not be soothed by the opinion’s technical language: This case allows the police to stop you on the street, demand your identification, and check it for outstanding traffic war rants—even if you are doing nothing wrong. If the officer discovers a warrant for a fine you forgot to pay, courts will now excuse his illegal stop and will admit into evidence anything he happens to find by searching you after arresting you on the warrant. Because the Fourth Amendment should prohibit, not permit, such misconduct, I dissent.
Warrantless DUI Breath Test Valid Search Incident to Arrest. Blood Test is Not.
Birchfield, ___ US ___, 136 SC 2160, ___ LE2 ___ (16) #14–1468:
The Court undertook a balancing analysis, weighing the degree of intrusiveness against the governmental interests. Breath tests have “negligible” physical intrusion. Not so blood tests. The government’s need for BAC evidence is “very important.” Therefore:
Having assessed the effect of BAC tests on privacy interests and the need for such tests, we conclude that the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrests for drunk driving. The impact of breath tests on privacy is slight, and the need for BAC testing is great.
We reach a different conclusion with respect to blood tests. Blood tests are significantly more intrusive, and their reasonableness must be judged in light of the availability of the less invasive alternative of a breath test. Respondents have offered no satisfactory justification for demanding the more intrusive alternative without a warrant.
The Court went on to hold that in states where test refusal can result in criminal sanctions, “implied consent” does not apply to the blood draw situation.
Mr. Al Menaster has observed that “The big question is what this means for Cal., which does not make it a crime to refuse but does provide for an enhancement.” There is certainly “an argument that the rule preventing refusal of a warrantless blood test from being a crime also bars imposing additional punishment for that refusal. The problem is that typically the officer offers the defendant a breath or blood test, and the refusal is generic.” Thus, a defendant would need “a specific refusal to take a blood test to fit into this case.”
Probation Search Did Not Cover Garage-Room Where Defendant Was Living
CARREON, ___ CA4 ___, ___ CR3 ___ (16) #H040632
Officers conducted a probation search of a residence where Def. was living with her son in an attached garage. They searched the garage unit, including drawers and a purse. In the purse was meth.
Def’s motion to suppress was denied. The Court of Appeal, per Rushing, P. J., reversed.
A probation search is based upon consent. But the garage/room her was in use by what was effectively an “overnight guest.” Does such a person have a legitimate expectation of privacy?
Yes.
The presence of an overnight guest should prompt a searching officer to pause and consider the guest’s privacy expectations before intruding into an area assigned to the guest. In our opinion, it flouts widely held social expectations to define joint access as simply having the physical ability to open a door, walk into a room, and open drawers.
Held:
We conclude that the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to justify a warrantless search or an objectively reasonable belief that the probationer had authority over the contents of either the drawers or the purse in defendant’s bedroom.