United States Supreme Court:
- Wesby, ___ US ___, 138 SC 577, ___ LE2 ___ (18):
Almost 10 years ago, Theodore Wesby attended a big party at a house in the northeast section of Washington, D.C. The music was loud, the strippers were lap dancing, the booze was flowing, and the acrid smell of hippie lettuce filled the air.
Neighbors complained, and the police arrived. They knocked on the door and a partygoer let them in. The floor was an unsightly mess and they thought it looked like vacant home (present company excluded).
They wanted to know whose place this was, and if the partygoers even had permission to be there. Two of the women “working” the party said that a woman named “Peaches” or “Tasty” (didn’t they mean “Tasty Peaches”?) was renting the house and had given them permission to be there.
The officers got Peaches on the phone. At first, she claimed that she was renting the house and had given the partygoers permission to have the party, but she eventually admitted that she did not have permission to use the house. The owner confirmed that he had not given anyone permission to be there.
The officers then arrested the partygoers for unlawful entry.
Several partygoers sued for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment and District law. The District Court concluded that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest the partygoers for unlawful entry and that two of the officers, petitioners here, were not entitled to qualified immunity. A divided panel of the D. C. Circuit affirmed.
The United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed.
According to the syllabus of the holding (citations omitted):
Considering the “totality of the circumstances” the officers made an “entirely reasonable inference” that the partygoers knew they did not have permission to be in the house. Taken together, the condition of the house and the conduct of the partygoers allowed the officers to make several “common-sense conclusions about human behavior.”
Because most homeowners do not live in such conditions or permit such activities in their homes, the officers could infer that the partygoers knew the party was not authorized. The officers also could infer that the partygoers knew that they were not supposed to be in the house because they scattered and hid when the officers arrived. The partygoers’ vague and implausible answers to questioning also gave the officers reason to infer that the partygoers were lying and that their lies suggested a guilty mind. Peaches’ lying and evasive behavior gave the officers reason to discredit everything she said. The officers also could have inferred that she lied when she said she had invited the partygoers to the house, or that she told the partygoers that she was not actually renting the house.
Of note is the opinion’s treatment of the “totality of the circumstances” calculation. It criticized the appellate panel’s analysis on two grounds:
First, it viewed each fact “in isolation, rather than as a factor in the totality of the circumstances.”
Second, it believed that it could dismiss outright any circumstances that were “susceptible of innocent explanation.” Instead, it should have asked whether a reasonable officer could conclude—considering all of the surrounding circumstances, including the plausibility of the explanation itself—that there was a “substantial chance of criminal activity.”
Suicide Threat Justifies Cursory Search of Residence via Community Caretaking Exception
- Ovieda, 19 CA5 614, 228 CR3 67 (18):
Def’s sister called 911 and said her brother was threatening to kill himself and had attempted suicide before. Santa Barbara police officers responded.
Another officer phoned the house, and got one Trevor Case who said they had Def pinned down, and that he had removed a handgun, two rifles, and ammunition to the garage. Case did not know whether Def had additional firearms or weapons in the house.
Def agreed to come outside, was detained, and falsely denied having made suicidal comments or that he had any firearms. Def said he was depressed because a friend committed suicide the week before.
The officers believed a cursory search was necessary because it was unknown how many more weapons were in the house, whether the weapons were secure, and whether anyone inside the house needed help. It was a concern because the person who made the 911 call, Def’s sister, was not at the scene and the officers did not know anything for sure.
The cursory sweep of the house revealed, in plain view, a rifle case, ammunition, magazines, and equipment to cultivate and produce concentrated cannabis.
Def was charged with manufacturing concentrated cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, §11379.6, subd. (a)) and possession of an assault weapon (Pen. Code, §30605, subd. (a)). After the trial court denied his motion to suppress, he pled out. This appeal followed.
The Court of Appeal, 2-1, affirmed.
In Ray, supra, 21 Cal.4th 464, our Supreme Court stated that the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment permits police to make a warrantless search of a home if the search is unrelated to the criminal investigation duties of the police. (Id. at p. 471.) “Upon entering a dwelling, officers view the occupant as a potential victim, not as a potential suspect.” (Ibid.) “Under the community caretaking exception, circumstances short of a perceived emergency may justify a warrantless entry” to preserve life or protect property. (Id. at p. 473.) Officers are expected to “‘“aid individuals who are in danger of physical harm,” “assist those who cannot care for themselves,” “resolve conflict,” . . . and “provide other services on an emergency basis.” . . .’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 471.)
In dissent, Perren, J, wrote:
At the time of the search, the situation was stabilized, appellant was restrained, and everyone reported to have been in the house was outside and unharmed. The officers had no information that anyone was in the house nor did they suspect that a crime had been committed. Therefore, the police could not lawfully enter and search the premises absent consent or a search warrant.
Responding to the dissent, Yegan, J., wrote:
The dissent’s bright line rule unreasonably stifles a police officer’s duty to proactively keep the peace for everyone in the community.
Institutional Security Outweighed Expectation of Privacy
- Golden, 19 CA5 905, 228 CR3 489 (18):
Def. was “sexually violent predator” (SVP) inmate at Coalinga State Hospital. Another inmate said Def. sold him child porn. Search of Def’s dorm section, patdown. Memory card, flash drive, 200 CDs of child porn. 1538.5 Den. Aff. Here, “institutional security” outweighed expectation of privacy.