• Glover, 589 US ___, 140 SC 1183, ___ LE2 ___ (20) #18–556:
A Kansas deputy sheriff ran a license plate check on a pickup truck, discovering that the truck belonged to respondent Glover and that Glover’s driver’s license had been revoked. The deputy pulled the truck over because he assumed that Glover was driving. Glover was in fact driving and was charged with driving as a habitual violator.
He moved to suppress all evidence from the stop, claiming that the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion. The District Court granted the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The Kansas Supreme Court in turn reversed, holding that the deputy violated the Fourth Amendment by stopping Glover without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
In what they call a “narrow” holding, the U.S. Supreme Court holds that the stop was valid. The law is as follows:
- The Fourth Amendment permits an officer to initiate a brief investigative traffic stop when he has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.
- The level of suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and less than is necessary for probable cause.
- Officers are permitted to make commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.
Applying that, the majority opinion by Thomas, J., holds:
Before initiating the stop, Deputy Mehrer observed an individual operating a 1995 Chevrolet 1500 pickup truck with Kansas plate 295ATJ. He also knew that the registered owner of the truck had a revoked license and that the model of the truck matched the observed vehicle. From these three facts, Deputy Mehrer drew the commonsense inference that Glover was likely the driver of the vehicle, which provided more than reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop.
Ah, but what about an observation that tends to negate the above “reasonable suspicion”? The Court addresses that:
[T[he presence of additional facts might dispel reasonable suspicion … For example, if an officer knows that the registered owner of the vehicle is in his mid-sixties but observes that the driver is in her mid-twenties, then the totality of the circumstances would not “raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.” … Here, Deputy Mehrer possessed no exculpatory information—let alone sufficient information to rebut the reasonable inference that Glover was driving his own truck—and thus the stop was justified. (Citations omitted)
The lone dissenter was Sotomayor, J. who argued that this approach flips the burden of proof. The majority addressed this in a footnote:
The dissent argues that this approach impermissibly places the burden of proof on the individual to negate the inference of reasonable suspicion. Not so. As the above analysis makes clear, it is the information possessed by the officer at the time of the stop, not any information offered by the individual after the fact, that can negate the inference. (Emphasis in original)
DUI Arrestee Did Not Object to or Resist Blood Draw. Therefore, Consent
- Lopez, 46 CA5 317, 260 CR3 18 (20) #C080065:
Police detained defendant after observing her driving. An Officer Adams observed defendant’s unsteady gait, constricted pupils, and slurred speech. He conducted field sobriety tests that indicated she was impaired. He had her blow into a preliminary alcohol screening (PAS) device which registered .000, indicating an absence of alcohol. He believed she was under the influence of controlled substances, as opposed to alcohol. He arrested her and transported her to the county jail.
Adams sought a blood sample from defendant. At trial, he explained his procedure for obtaining a blood sample from DUI suspects as follows: “So what we’ll normally do is I’ll advise them that they’re required to, by law, to give a blood sample. We will transport them to the Placer County Jail, a phlebotomist will respond and take the blood sample, which I will witness. I will then take possession of the blood and book it into evidence.”
Adams stated he told defendant that “since she was under arrest for a DUI, and since I believed it was a controlled substance DUI, she’s required, by law, to submit to a blood test.” The officer said defendant did not refuse the blood test: “She consented and cooperated.” She did not object or resist at any point. If she had refused, he would have obtained a warrant and performed a forced blood draw.
Defendant’s motion to suppress was denied. The Court of Appeal, per Hull, Act. P. J., affirmed.
Defendant claimed there was insufficient evidence of voluntary consent, as Officer Adams did not provide the admonitions required by the implied consent law. Thus, any consent was merely her submission to a claim of lawful authority and any consent was coerced.
The question is one of “totality of the circumstances” to see if an arrestee’s actions imply actual consent. Here, they did:
Officer Adams correctly instructed defendant that she was required to undergo a blood test. Defendant did not object or refuse to undergo the test. She did not resist any of the officers’ directions or actions. She voluntarily placed her arm on the table to allow the phlebotomist to draw her blood.
A second argument from the defendant contended that her consent could not be voluntary because she submitted to Officer Adams’ misrepresentation of a lawful claim of authority. The officer told defendant she was required to give a blood sample. Defendant claims this statement was an order under authority of law, and it was a misstatement because case law requires either voluntary consent or a warrant.
The court did not buy it:
Officer Adams’s omission of the admonitions was one factor for the trial court to consider when it reviewed the totality of the circumstances. The omission did not deny defendant her right to withdraw her implied consent and compel her to consent. The court reviewed all of the circumstances and evidence, including Officer Adams’s omission, and it concluded defendant had actually consented to the blood draw. Substantial evidence supports its finding of fact.