• Pritchett, 102 CA5 355, 321 CR3 173 (24) #A168411:
Def. had been placed on three-year probation for a misdemeanor with a search condition. A year-and-a-half later, Assembly Bill No. 1950 went into effect, limiting the maximum term of probation a trial court is allowed to impose for most misdemeanor offenses to one year.
Def’s probation was thus terminated. But a database, Crimnet, used in Sonoma County, still listed her as on active probation with the search condition.
A narcotics detective relied on the database to conduct a warrantless search of Def’s hotel room, and found fentanyl.
Def. was charged with one felony count of possession for sale of a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.) She moved to suppress. In her motion, she argued that AB 1950 applied retroactively to her probation, and as a result it was terminated when AB 1950 became effective. Therefore, she argued, the warrantless search of her room was unlawful.
She acknowledged that law enforcement was not “directly” at fault for Crimnet’s erroneous information about her probation status but contended the evidence should be excluded anyway since that information was the only basis for the search.
The trial court granted her motion. The Court of Appeal, per Langhorne Wilson, J., reversed.
On this record, we cannot conclude that Vlahandreas would or should have known that the information on Crimnet regarding Pritchett’s probation status was incorrect. Crimnet contains information directly from the judicial system, including whether a person’s probation had terminated. Vlahandreas found Crimnet accurate and could not recall an instance where he had incorrectly noted someone in the system was on searchable probation. He had been a detective for three years and used Crimnet extensively in his investigations. He used it to check Pritchett’s probation status the morning of the search, and it showed that her probation was still active and included a condition that she submit to warrantless searches of her residence. The record reveals no reason for Vlahandreas to believe Crimnet provided erroneous information in this instance. Based on these facts, he was acting objectively reasonably when he relied on Crimnet.
P-C For One Charge Does Not Defeat 4th Violation on a Baseless Charge
- CHIAVERINI, 602 U.S. ___, 44 SC 1745, ___ LE2 ___ (2024) #23-50:
This is a malicious prosecution case under 42 U. S. C. §1983. From the syllabus:
This case involves a dispute between petitioner Jascha Chiaverini and police officers from Napoleon, Ohio. The officers charged Chiaverini, a jewelry store owner, with three crimes: receiving stolen property, a misdemeanor; dealing in precious metals without a license, also a misdemeanor; and money laundering, a felony. After obtaining a warrant, the police arrested Chiaverini and detained him for three days. But county prosecutors later dropped the case.
Chiaverini, believing that his arrest and detention were unjustified, then sued the officers, alleging what is known as a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim under 42 U. S. C. §1983.
To prevail on this claim, he had to show that the officers brought criminal charges against him without probable cause, leading to an unreasonable seizure of his person. The District Court, however, granted summary judgment to the officers, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
The Court of Appeals held that Chiaverini’s prosecution was supported by probable cause. In holding this, the court did not address whether the officers had probable cause to bring the money-laundering charge. In its view, there was clearly probable cause to charge Chiaverini with the two misdemeanors. And so long as one charge was supported by probable cause, it thought, a malicious-prosecution claim based on any other charge must fail.
Held: The presence of probable cause for one charge in a criminal proceeding does not categorically defeat a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim relating to another, baseless charge.
For the majority, Justice Kagan writes:
Consider first how that result follows from established Fourth Amendment law. Under that Amendment, a pre-trial detention (like the one Chiaverini suffered) must be based on probable cause….Otherwise, such a detention counts as an unreasonable seizure. And even when a detention is justified at the outset, it may become unreasonably prolonged if the reason for it lapses….So if an invalid charge—say, one fabricated by police officers—causes a detention either to start or to continue, then the Fourth Amendment is violated. And that is so even when a valid charge has also been brought… [Citations omitted]
In dissent, Justice Gorsuch wrote:
[T]he Court today doubles down on a new tort of its own recent invention—what it calls a “Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution” cause of action….Respectfully, it is hard to know where this tort comes from. Stare for as long as you like at the Fourth Amendment and you won’t see anything about prosecutions, malicious or otherwise. Instead, the Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”
As its language suggests, the Fourth Amendment supplies nothing like a common-law claim for malicious prosecution.
Consciousness of Guilt May Be Based on DUI Blood Draw Refusal
- Bolourchi, ___ CA5 ___, ___ CR3 ___ (24) #A167289:
The Court of Appeal, per Streeter, J.:
Under Vehicle Code section 23612, subdivision (a)(1)(B), “A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood for the purpose of determining the drug content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for” driving while under the influence of a drug in violation of section 23152, subdivision (f). The question presented here is this: If, following a valid arrest for such an offense, a motorist refuses to cooperate in the taking of a blood test unless a warrant is first obtained, may the jury at the motorist’s ensuing DUI trial draw an adverse inference of consciousness of guilt based on that refusal?
Our answer is yes.