- Meza, 90 CA5 520, 307 CR 235 (23) #B318310:
What the heck is a “geofence”? Well, it’s a virtual fence around a physical location. Geofencing is a type of location-based targeting. For example, a user can set it up so when he and his enter a defined geographical boundary, the user gets an alert. A student might walk near a computer store, and then get a text message that says, “Today only! Buy a laptop and get an e-reader free!”
If that’s your idea of a good time, have at it, but, as Samuel Goldwyn used to say, include me out.
Anyway, law enforcement can request a “geofence warrant” to access device location data gathered by large tech companies, like Google. While this data is typically anonymized (there’s another word for you), it can be “used in conjunction with other investigative techniques to tie devices to specific users—and identify persons of interest in a criminal investigation.” [Quoting Meza]
In this case, Daniel Meza and Walter Meneses were identified as suspects in the murder of Adbadalla Thabet after a geofence search warrant directed to Google revealed cell phones signed in to Google accounts connected to them were in several of the same locations as Thabet on the day of his murder. After their motions to quash and suppress evidence were denied, Meza pleaded guilty to first degree murder; and Meneses pleaded no contest to second degree murder.
On appeal, Def’s contended the trial court erred in denying their motion to suppress, arguing the geofence warrant violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and did not comply with the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA) of 2016 (Pen. Code, § 1546 et seq.) The court holds that the geofence warrant satisfied the requirements of CalECPA, but lacked the particularity required by the Fourth Amendment and was impermissibly overbroad. However, suppression denial is affirmed under the Good Faith Exception.
Given the dearth of authority directly on point and the novelty of the particular surveillance technique at issue, the officers were not objectively unreasonable in believing the warrant was valid, even if the issue, upon close legal examination, is not a particularly close one.
California Supreme Court
When is a Prosecutor Entitled to a 1538.5 Continuance?
Continuances in criminal cases are covered by PC 1050:
“Continuances shall be granted only upon a showing of good cause. Neither the convenience of the parties nor a stipulation of the parties is in and of itself good cause.” (§ 1050, subd. (e).) Convenience of witnesses is, however, a factor for the court to consider both in deciding whether good cause has been shown and in selecting the new date. (§ 1050, subd. (g)(1).) If the court concludes that a continuance is necessary, it must state on the record the facts justifying that finding. (§ 1050, subd. (f).) Any permitted continuance must be limited to “only . . . that period of time shown to be necessary by the evidence considered at the hearing on the motion.” (§ 1050, subd. (i).)
Section 1050 provides for two different good cause showings. If the moving party has not complied with the procedures of subdivision (b), it must show that there is good cause to excuse that failure. If such a showing is not made the court may impose sanctions. As to the merits of a continuance motion, subdivision (e) requires a good cause showing that a continuance is necessary.
Trial courts enjoy broad discretion to deny continuances unsupported by a showing of good cause. However, established case law holds that it is an abuse of discretion to deny a trial continuance, solely because good cause is lacking, when doing so will result in dismissal of the charges and the continuance can be granted without violating the defendant’s speedy trial rights. (See People v. Ferguson (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1173.
Re: a 1538.5 motion, if the challenged evidence is so critical that its suppression would require dismissal of the case, the court must generally grant a continuance unless dismissal would be in furtherance of justice. The burden is on the prosecution to show an inability to go forward without the evidence in dispute. The court, however, must ultimately determine whether dismissal of the case is reasonably probable absent a continuance.
It is an abuse of discretion for a court to deny a continuance within the speedy trial period, absent countervailing factors warranting dismissal.
In Brown, 4 C5 530, 306 CR3 25, 525 P3 1036 (23) #S271877, the California Supreme Court reverses the Court of Appeal, and holds that it was an abuse of discretion to deny a continuance. And:
In determining whether the denial of a continuance will make it reasonably foreseeable that a case will be dismissed, the court must consider the totality of the extant circumstances. One of the factors to be considered is the People’s representation that they will be unable to proceed without the challenged evidence. But the court must independently examine that representation. In the end it is the court’s determination, not the People’s representation, that is dispositive. The reasonable foreseeability standard comes into play when the case cannot be tried absent the evidence, not when the case will simply be more difficult to prove.
Additionally:
This is not to say that the court’s hands are tied when the prosecution seeks a continuance without satisfying section 1050’s requirements. It may impose fines, refer the prosecutor for discipline, and impose any other sanctions at its disposal short of dismissal for procedural noncompliance. (§ 1050.5, subd. (b); see § 1050, subd. (b).) “And, of course, the trial court may exercise its discretion in selecting the length of a continuance; it need not necessarily accede to the prosecutor’s preferred date.” (Ferrer, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 886.)