Category Archives: Good Faith

Sep 23 2024
Good Faith, Probable Cause, Temporary Detention

Good Faith Didn’t Save Search Beyond Scope of Warrant

• DiMAGGIO, ___ CA5 ___, ___ CR3 ___ (24) #H051516:

Search warrant was issued for Def’s cellphone and tablet for text and images relating to a sexual assault accusation. The S-W had a limited date range and specified searching only images with “time stamps.” Offs searched beyond the scope and found child porn.

Def’s motion to suppress was denied. The Court of Appeal, 2-1, per Danner, J., reversed.

A search pursuant to “a valid warrant may nonetheless be unreasonable if the officers conducting the search exceed the scope of the warrant and, for example, begin looking for files that are not related to the subject of the search warrant.” (United States v. Johnston (9th Cir. 2015) 789 F.3d 934.)

The People argued, and the court below agreed, that the Good Faith Exception applied to the facts here.

The key to this good faith exception “is ‘that the officers properly executed the warrant and searched only those places and for those objects that it was reasonable to believe were covered by the warrant.’ ” [citing MacAvoy, 162 CA3 476 (84)].

In this case, however:

An objectively reasonable officer would understand that date and time limitations in a search warrant for electronic information would require them to filter the data in a manner that returned only items falling within that timeframe. Conversely, an objectively reasonable officer would not conclude that including items without timestamps would yield only items that comply with the temporal parameters of the search warrant. Rather, they would understand that such a search would be likely to yield both items that fall within the specified timeframe and items that fall outside of it.

***

Because Acevedo, Gonzalez, and Hoskins did not act within the scope of the search warrant in conducting their search of DiMaggio’s cellphone, but, rather, intentionally disregarded and substantially exceeded the limitations in the warrant’s scope, the good faith exception does not apply.

Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J., dissented.

Loose Marijuana in Plain View, Plus Other Factors, Gave P-C to Search Auto

  • Sellers, ___ CA5 ___, 324 CR3 650 (24) #C100036:

Traffic stop. Defendant was passenger. Officer asked driver for license and if there was any marijuana in the car. Driver said no. But Officer saw in the back of the vehicle a tray “commonly used for rolling marijuana cigarettes or blunts.” The tray was covered in a sticky residue “consistent with marijuana.”

Another Officer conducted a plain view search by peering through the rear passenger’s side window with a flashlight. He saw “crumbs” of marijuana scattered on the rear floorboard, as well as “somewhat larger” “round circular nuggets” of marijuana under the front passenger seat.

Based on the loose marijuana observed on the floorboard, together with the marijuana rolling tray and other factors, the officers concluded there was probable cause to search the vehicle. They asked Defendant and driver to exit the vehicle so officers could perform the probable cause search. As Defendant was preparing to exit the vehicle, Officer asked if he had any weapons on him. Defendant responded that he had a firearm, which was located on the side of the passenger seat. Officer found a black nine-millimeter handgun underneath the front passenger seat.

Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a person previously having been adjudged a ward of the court (Pen. Code, § 29820).

Defendant moved to suppress the MJ and gun. Denied. The Court of Appeal, 2-1 per Kraus J., affirmed. Dissent by Duarte, J.

Since the passage of Proposition 64,courts have held that lawful possession of marijuana in a vehicle, by itself, does not provide probable cause for a warrantless search on the theory that there may be a greater, unlawful amount of marijuana in the vehicle…. [W]hile possession of a lawful amount of marijuana alone is insufficient to establish probable cause, it may support a finding of probable cause if it is coupled with other factors contributing to a reasonable belief that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity.

***

Defendant’s principal argument is that small amounts of “stray marijuana” scattered around the floorboards of a vehicle does not provide probable cause for a search….The People argued that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the police had probable cause to conduct the search based on the evidence that (1) the suspects seemed nervous, (2) the suspects falsely stated there was no marijuana in the vehicle, (3) officers saw a marijuana rolling tray in the back of the vehicle, and (4) officers observed a “usable” amount of loose marijuana scattered on the floorboard.

The court noted that while Proposition 64 decriminalized the use and possession of marijuana in limited circumstances, it did not decriminalize marijuana use and possession in all circumstances, and VC 11362.3 subdivision (a)(4) states that it is unlawful to “[p]ossess an open container or open package of cannabis . . . while driving, operating, or riding in the passenger seat or compartment of a motor vehicle . . . .”

Defendant argued there was no “open container” violation because the marijuana observed by the police officers was not in a “container.”

Defendant’s argument does not hold up under scrutiny. Although the words used in a statute are the most useful guide to its intent, the language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would frustrate the purposes of the legislation or lead to absurd results….It would defy logic to conclude that an individual with an unsealed container or open package of marijuana is violating the law, while someone with usable amounts of marijuana scattered loosely on a seat or around the passenger compartment is not.

Ordering Out of Auto Does Not Require Justification

  • Ramirez, 104 CA5 315, 324 CR3 583 (24) #G063224:

Traffic stop. Offs ordered Defendant out of car. Saw handgun. Supp. Rev. Per Mimms, 434 US 106 (77), no “articulable justification” needed for ordering out of vehicle.

Side note: D.A.’s brief said trial court “fabricated” a legal theory to grant the motion. The court here says, “We advise the district attorney in the future to be more cautious and consider his language more carefully when challenging a ruling of a trial court in an appellate brief, or he may be subject to sanctions. Words are to lawyers, as scalpels are to surgeons. They are tools to be used with precision.”

Jul 20 2024
Good Faith

Good Faith Reliance on Erroneous Database Info

• Pritchett, 102 CA5 355, 321 CR3 173 (24) #A168411:

Def. had been placed on three-year probation for a misdemeanor with a search condition. A year-and-a-half later, Assembly Bill No. 1950 went into effect, limiting the maximum term of probation a trial court is allowed to impose for most misdemeanor offenses to one year.

Def’s probation was thus terminated. But a database, Crimnet, used in Sonoma County, still listed her as on active probation with the search condition.

A narcotics detective relied on the database to conduct a warrantless search of Def’s hotel room, and found fentanyl.

Def. was charged with one felony count of possession for sale of a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.) She moved to suppress. In her motion, she argued that AB 1950 applied retroactively to her probation, and as a result it was terminated when AB 1950 became effective. Therefore, she argued, the warrantless search of her room was unlawful.

She acknowledged that law enforcement was not “directly” at fault for Crimnet’s erroneous information about her probation status but contended the evidence should be excluded anyway since that information was the only basis for the search.

The trial court granted her motion. The Court of Appeal, per Langhorne Wilson, J., reversed.

On this record, we cannot conclude that Vlahandreas would or should have known that the information on Crimnet regarding Pritchett’s probation status was incorrect. Crimnet contains information directly from the judicial system, including whether a person’s probation had terminated. Vlahandreas found Crimnet accurate and could not recall an instance where he had incorrectly noted someone in the system was on searchable probation. He had been a detective for three years and used Crimnet extensively in his investigations. He used it to check Pritchett’s probation status the morning of the search, and it showed that her probation was still active and included a condition that she submit to warrantless searches of her residence. The record reveals no reason for Vlahandreas to believe Crimnet provided erroneous information in this instance. Based on these facts, he was acting objectively reasonably when he relied on Crimnet.

P-C For One Charge Does Not Defeat 4th Violation on a Baseless Charge

  • CHIAVERINI, 602 U.S. ___, 44 SC 1745, ___ LE2 ___ (2024) #23-50:

This is a malicious prosecution case under 42 U. S. C. §1983. From the syllabus:

This case involves a dispute between petitioner Jascha Chiaverini and police officers from Napoleon, Ohio. The officers charged Chiaverini, a jewelry store owner, with three crimes: receiving stolen property, a misdemeanor; dealing in precious metals without a license, also a misdemeanor; and money laundering, a felony. After obtaining a warrant, the police arrested Chiaverini and detained him for three days. But county prosecutors later dropped the case.

Chiaverini, believing that his arrest and detention were unjustified, then sued the officers, alleging what is known as a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim under 42 U. S. C. §1983.

To prevail on this claim, he had to show that the officers brought criminal charges against him without probable cause, leading to an unreasonable seizure of his person. The District Court, however, granted summary judgment to the officers, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

The Court of Appeals held that Chiaverini’s prosecution was supported by probable cause. In holding this, the court did not address whether the officers had probable cause to bring the money-laundering charge. In its view, there was clearly probable cause to charge Chiaverini with the two misdemeanors. And so long as one charge was supported by probable cause, it thought, a malicious-prosecution claim based on any other charge must fail.

Held: The presence of probable cause for one charge in a criminal proceeding does not categorically defeat a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim relating to another, baseless charge.

For the majority, Justice Kagan writes:

Consider first how that result follows from established Fourth Amendment law. Under that Amendment, a pre-trial detention (like the one Chiaverini suffered) must be based on probable cause….Otherwise, such a detention counts as an unreasonable seizure. And even when a detention is justified at the outset, it may become unreasonably prolonged if the reason for it lapses….So if an invalid charge—say, one fabricated by police officers—causes a detention either to start or to continue, then the Fourth Amendment is violated. And that is so even when a valid charge has also been brought… [Citations omitted]

In dissent, Justice Gorsuch wrote:

[T]he Court today doubles down on a new tort of its own recent invention—what it calls a “Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution” cause of action….Respectfully, it is hard to know where this tort comes from. Stare for as long as you like at the Fourth Amendment and you won’t see anything about prosecutions, malicious or otherwise. Instead, the Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”

As its language suggests, the Fourth Amendment supplies nothing like a common-law claim for malicious prosecution.

Consciousness of Guilt May Be Based on DUI Blood Draw Refusal

  • Bolourchi, ___ CA5 ___, ___ CR3 ___ (24) #A167289:

The Court of Appeal, per Streeter, J.:

Under Vehicle Code section 23612, subdivision (a)(1)(B), “A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood for the purpose of determining the drug content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for” driving while under the influence of a drug in violation of section 23152, subdivision (f). The question presented here is this: If, following a valid arrest for such an offense, a motorist refuses to cooperate in the taking of a blood test unless a warrant is first obtained, may the jury at the motorist’s ensuing DUI trial draw an adverse inference of consciousness of guilt based on that refusal?

Our answer is yes.