• LOPEZ, 8 C5 353, ___ CR3 ___, 453 P3 150 (19) #S238627:
In Arturo D., 27 C4 60 (02) the California Supreme Court upheld a limited search of places in a vehicle where a driver might have hidden ID after a traffic stop. Here, in a split decision, the court revisits and overturns Arturo D. in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in GANT, 556 US 332 (09).
Acting on an anonymous tip about erratic driving, a police officer approached defendant Maria Elena Lopez after she parked and exited her car. When the officer asked if she had a driver’s license, she said she did not. Police then detained her for unlicensed driving and, without asking her name, searched the car for Lopez’s personal identification. They found methamphetamine in a purse sitting on the front passenger’s seat.
Def’s motion to suppress was granted by the trial court, but reversed by the Court of Appeal. Now the California Supreme Court reverses, upholds the suppression, and remands for further proceedings.
But after considering both further guidance from the United States Supreme Court and the practices of every other state in the nation, we conclude the time has come to correct a misperception of the constraints of the Fourth Amendment in this context. We recognize that law enforcement agencies have crafted policies in reliance on Arturo D., and our decision today will require them to adopt a different approach in scenarios like the one presented here. But inasmuch as subsequent legal developments have called the validity of the traffic-stop identification-search exception into question, the change in approach is warranted.
***
For these reasons, we now hold the Fourth Amendment does not contain an exception to the warrant requirement for searches to locate a driver’s identification following a traffic stop. To the extent it created such an exception, In re Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th 60, is overruled and should no longer be followed.
Note, however, that this is only a holding on a per se rule. Other exceptions still apply, for example:
CONSENT: Ingle, 129 CA3 188, 181 CR 39 (82): From outside of auto, Def. said her license was in wallet under seat. Off. entered and seized it, smelled fresh, unburned MJ. Found it in basket and trunk.
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES: Faddler, 132 CA3 607, 183 CR 328 (82): At 2 a.m. 3 were in auto driven erratically. One leaning out window with whiskey glass, shouting. Stopped by Off., took off, stopped 2nd time. Ordered out. Def. said driver’s Lic. was in glove compartment. Off. opened door to retrieve it and saw MJ baggie on floor. More found later. 995 Dis. Rev. Exigent circumstances justified Off. getting license himself for his own safety.
The Court also riffed on the crime of lying to an officer (Pen. Code, § 148.9; Veh. Code, §§ 31, 40000.5.) If the officer manages to adduce evidence that the subject is lying about their identity, then the officer may search upon probable cause to believe evidence of such lying will be found in the vehicle.
Obsolete “Community Caretaking” Exception Can’t Save Police Break-in Search
• RUBIO, ___CA5 ___, ___ CR3 ___ (19) #A152455:
Police responded to shots fired outside a home in “high crime neighborhood.” Arriving, they found shell casings and detained a bellicose man, one Bazan. At front door, Def’s father let officers in. Def. emerged from garage-apartment into the house, locking the door behind him. Offs broke down the door and found weapons, ammo and meth.
The People attempted to justify the breaking-and-entering search as falling under the “community caretaking” exception. Def’s 1538.5 motion was denied, and the Court of Appeal affirmed.
But then!
Less than four weeks after we announced our decision, the California Supreme Court decided Ovieda [7 C5 1034, 250 CR3 754, 446 P3 262 (19)], in which it disapproved the lead opinion in Ray to the extent the prior decision had relied on an expansive reading of the community caretaking exception to allow warrantless entry into a home. (Ovieda, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1038.) We then, on our own motion, granted rehearing and asked the parties to brief the significance of Ovieda for this case.
The opening of the opinion sums up the holding:
If a man lives in a high crime neighborhood and somebody discharges a firearm outside his home, may the police break down his door and enter his apartment when he refuses to invite them in to investigate? The Fourth Amendment answers a resounding “no”—at least not without circumstances, not present here, that would cause a reasonable person to believe that someone in the apartment stood in need of emergency aid, or that some other exception to the warrant requirement applied. The need to render emergency aid justifies warrantless entry only where officers have “ ‘ “specific and articulable facts” ’ ” showing that an intrusion into the home was necessary. (People v. Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1043 (Ovieda).) It is not enough that officers seek to rule out “the possibility that someone . . . might require aid.” (Id. at p. 1047.)
These principles render the warrantless search of defendant Adan Rubio’s garage apartment unconstitutional.
Recorded Phone Conversation in Violation of PC 632 is Admissible
• Guzman, 8 C5 673, ___ CR3 ___, ___ P3 ___ (19) #S242244:
A jury convicted Def. of two counts of committing a lewd and lascivious act upon a child after it heard a recorded phone conversation between the mother of one of the victims and defendant’s niece. The mother had secretly recorded the conversation without the niece’s consent, thereby violating Penal Code section 632. Subdivision (d) of that section prohibits the admission of “evidence obtained . . . in violation of this section . . . in any judicial, administrative, legislative, or other proceeding.” (§ 632, subd. (d) (hereafter section 632(d)).) The Court of Appeal, however, found that section 632(d) has been abrogated in the relevant part by “the ‘Right to Truth in Evidence’ provision of the California Constitution. The court thus concluded the recording was properly admitted and affirmed defendant’s convictions.
The Cal. Supreme Court granted review to determine the continued viability of section 632(d) in light of the limits placed on the exclusion of evidence by the “Right to Truth-in-Evidence” provision of the Constitution.
Within the context of defendant’s criminal trial, the recording in this case was relevant evidence. By the express terms of the Right to Truth-in-Evidence provision, therefore, the recording could “not be excluded.”
We conclude that to the extent section 632(d) demanded the suppression of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding, it was abrogated when the voters approved Proposition 8. Moreover, although the Legislature amended section 632 by a two-thirds vote several times after the enactment of Proposition 8, none of these amendments revived the exclusionary remedy of section 632(d). In each of these instances, the Legislature reenacted section 632(d) only as an incident to its enactment of other statutory provisions. Nothing in the language, history, or context of the amendments evinces an intent on the part of the Legislature to render surreptitious recordings once again inadmissible in criminal proceedings.