Bell's Compendium

• Wilson, ___ CA5 ___, ___ CR3 ___ (20) #D074992

Def. sent child porn via attachments in Gmail, which is owned by Google. Google has an automated system that flags potential child porn. The system then generates a report, complete with copies of the images, and sends it to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). This is called a “Cybertip.” Determining that the internet address in the email came out of San Diego, the NCMEC forwarded the report to the San Diego Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) task force.

Using the information contained in the report, and based on his review of the images, an ICAC investigator obtained a search warrant to obtain from Google all content and user information associated with the Gmail address. This resulted in the discovery of Def’s e-mails offering to pay a minor to molest and exploit children and the distribution of child pornography to others. Another warrant issued for Def’s apartment and vehicle, resulting in finding a thumb drive with thousands of child porn images.

Def. moved under 1538.5 to suppress the search of the original images, and all subsequent evidence. Denied. The Court of Appeal, per Guerrero, J., affirmed.

The court held that Google’s automated search was private, not done in concert with law enforcement. It also held, per Jacobsen, 466 US 109 (84) that the subsequent viewing of the evidence did not expand on the original private search.

In sum, the government’s warrantless search of Wilson’s four images was permissible under the private search doctrine. Google’s private search frustrated Wilson’s expectation of privacy in the files before they were viewed by the government. Google had already identified Wilson’s files as having matching hash values to images that had previously been viewed and identified by a Google employee as apparent child pornography. The government’s subsequent opening and viewing of the four photographs did not significantly expand on the search that had previously been conducted by Google. The agent’s actions in opening the files and viewing the images merely confirmed that the flagged files were child pornography, as reflected in Google’s Cybertip report.

Warrantless Cell Phone Ping Justified Under “Exigent Circumstances”

• Bowen, 52 CA5 130, 265 CR3 824 (20) #A155630

Def had a dispute with Dennis N. over the car of Def’s dog, Dash. Dennis said Def owed him $2,000. Def said Dennis was doing it “pro bono.” A series of texts ensued.

Eventually, Def went to Dennis’s mobile home. Things got ugly—Def and Dennis gave conflicting accounts—but Def stabbed Dennis several times in the neck with a three-inch pocket knife. Dennis ran toward a nearby preschool, screaming for help. Def fled the scene.

The police arrived. Dennis gave them Def’s cell number. And officer called police dispatch, asked them to contact defendant’s mobile phone service provider to determine the defendant’s possible location. This was done, officers went to the location and found Def walking on the trail wearing a backpack, a jacket, and no shirt. He was arrested; his cell phone, backpack, and several knives were seized. Def had blood on his right ear, and DNA tests confirmed the blood was consistent with both defendant’s and Dennis N.’s.

Def filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his backpack on the grounds that the police failed to obtain a warrant before having defendant’s service provider ping his cell phone to locate him. The People argued the warrantless cell phone ping was justified by exigent circumstances.

Suppression denied. The Court of Appeal, per Jackson, J., affirmed. This was a situation where the hot pursuit of a dangerous suspect created an emergency under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.

Here, at the time Officer Adams requested a ping of defendant’s cell phone, the information available to him was that less than an hour earlier Dennis N. had been repeatedly stabbed in the neck in an unprovoked attack, within 200 yards of a preschool and near a shopping center and multiple neighborhoods. Further, the suspect, who was possibly still armed with a knife, had fled on foot. The area where the witnesses indicated the defendant had headed was a several-hundred-yard field with multiple entrances and exits leading to a creek trail, houses and apartment complexes, and a store; and there are “hundreds of people moving about” the area. The police were actively looking for defendant when they received the CSLI [cell-site location information]. Based upon the circumstances known to Officer Adams, he believed it was imperative that the suspect be found as soon as possible to prevent another possible unprovoked attack. We agree with the trial court’s determination that the exigent circumstances exception applies under the facts of this case, and defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett and the Fourth Amendment

How will the newest Justice of the Supreme Court rule when it comes to the Fourth Amendment? Of course, no one can know for certain what cases and facts will come before the Court. But two Seventh Circuit decisions authored by Justice Barrett may hold a clue.

In U.S. v. Terry, 915 F3 1141 (19), then-Judge Barrett wrote the following as the lead to her opinion:

Is it reasonable for officers to assume that a woman who answers the door in a bathrobe has authority to consent to a search of a male suspect’s residence? We hold that the answer is no. The officers could reasonably assume that the woman had spent the night at the apartment, but that’s about as far as a bathrobe could take them. Without more, it was unreasonable for them to conclude that she and the suspect shared access to or control over the property.

What’s nice about that paragraph is how clean it is. It clearly elucidates the facts, the issue, and the law.

The other opinion of note is United States v. Watson, 900 F3 892 (18). Judge Barrett’s opening was, again, clear:

The police received an anonymous 911 call from a 14‐year‐old who borrowed a stranger’s phone and reported seeing “boys” “playing with guns” by a “gray and greenish Charger” in a nearby parking lot. A police officer then drove to the lot and blocked a car matching the caller’s description. The police found that a passenger in the car, David Watson, had a gun. He later conditionally pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), but preserved for appeal his argument that the court should have suppressed the gun because the stop lacked reasonable suspicion.

We agree with Watson that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to block the car. The anonymous tip did not justify an immediate stop because the caller’s report was not sufficiently reliable. The caller used a borrowed phone, which would make it difficult to find him, and his sighting of guns did not describe a likely emergency or crime—he reported gun possession, which is lawful.

• ROSAS, 50 CA5 17, ___ CR3 ___ (20) #B295921

Oxnard Police Officers Coronel and Salvio responded to a report of a suspicious person in a passenger truck in front of the residence. When the officers arrived at the location, they saw appellant sitting in the driver’s seat of a parked truck with the driver’s side door open.

Appellant said he lived just two houses away and had come outside to smoke a cigarette and listen to music. He gave his name and address, said he did not have a driver’s license, and added that he had a state identification card but did not have it on him.

During this exchange, Officer Coronel walked over to the front passenger window of the truck, shined a flashlight through the slightly-open window and into the front passenger compartment, and moved the flashlight around to illuminate the compartment.

Officer Salvio asked, “Do you have any probation or parole or anything like that?” Appellant replied, “No.”

Officer Salvio called police dispatch to run a records check to confirm appellant’s identity and determine if he had any warrants or was on probation or parole. The dispatcher verified appellant’s identity and address and stated that appellant was on probation out of Kern County and was a “290 registrant.” However, the dispatcher said nothing about probation search conditions.

Officer Salvio conducted a search of appellant, and found meth. In the truck he found a glass pipe with meth residue.

Appellant’s 1538.5 motion was denied. The Court of Appeal, per Perren, J., reverses.

Before an officer can conduct a warrantless probation search, he has to know that the probation has search conditions attached. In this instance, Def. was actually not on probation; but nevertheless, the erroneous report did not mention conditions.

Officer Salvio testified that he was a young officer, and assumed anyone on probation has a search condition attached. The trial court, in denying the motion, said, well, “99.9 percent of the time that’s true.”

It is well-settled, however, that “the [probation] exception is inapplicable if police are unaware of the probation search condition at the time of a warrantless search.” (People v. Hoeninghaus (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1184, italics added.)

***

It is thus clear that the warrantless searches of appellant’s person and truck cannot be upheld as probation searches. Moreover, the People failed to meet their burden of proving that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied; indeed, the People offered no evidence whatsoever on this issue.

Yegan, J., filed a dissent.

Without expressly saying so, the fair import of the majority opinion is that the officers in the field cannot rely on a police dispatcher who is reading from a rap sheet and they cannot draw the inference of search terms from a grant of probation. This is a novel claim and is at variance with common sense and experience. And this mistake is not subject to the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule? This is also a novel claim.

Odor of Marijuana Alone No Longer Provides an Inference That Car Contains Contraband

• JOHNSON, ___ CA5 ___, ___ CR3 ___ (20) #C089373

Defendant was parked on the side of a road when two police officers approached to investigate his car’s missing registration tag. Defendant ended up handcuffed in the patrol car for resisting an officer.

After defendant was detained, one of the officers approached defendant’s car to perform what the officer described as a tow inventory search. The officer smelled marijuana emanating from the car and found a plastic bag containing “[p]ossibly a couple grams” of marijuana in the center console. The bag was knotted at the top. The search then purportedly transitioned from an inventory search into a probable cause search, which revealed a loaded handgun in the rear cargo area of the car.

Defendant sought to suppress the evidence from the search, but the motion and his renewed motion were denied. The magistrate and trial judge found the search was not an inventory search, but upheld it based on probable cause. Defendant pled no contest to being a felon in possession of a firearm.

The Court of Appeal, per Robie, Acting P.J., reversed.

Prop 64 legalized possession of up to 28.5 grams of marijuana by individuals 21 years or older. The People, however, argued that, even though the baggie containing the marijuana was knotted at the top, the fact that it could have been untied at some point meant it constituted an open container within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section 11362.3, subdivision (a)(4). In the People’s view, this violation of the open container law gave the officers probable cause to search the rest of the vehicle.

In summary, the facts in this case comprised of a parked car missing a registration tag and having an expired registration, the odor of marijuana emanating from the car, the observation of a tied baggie containing “a couple grams” of marijuana in the car’s center console, and defendant’s actions outside the car in resisting the officers. The totality of these circumstances did not amount to a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime” would be found in defendant’s car. (Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 238 [76 L.Ed.2d at p. 548].) Accordingly, the search of defendant’s car violated the Fourth Amendment.

 

Officer’s Unreasonable “Mistake of Law” Renders Arrest Illegal

• Gerberding, 50 CA5 Supp. 1, 263 CR3 702 #2816

Officer approached homeless encampment where a loaded shopping cart with a broken wheel was obstructing the sidewalk. When Def. refused to move it, he was detained but resisted arrest. The arresting officer thought he was upholding a local city ordinance, to wit:

No person shall stand or sit upon any street so as in any manner to hinder or obstruct the passage therein of person passing along the same, or so as in any manner to annoy or molest persons passing along the same…

Def. contended that the ordinance specifies “no person,” which the shopping cart most assuredly was not.

The plain language of FMC section 13-109 only prohibits blocking a street with one’s body, not one’s property. Thus, Officer Kahn was mistaken when he concluded that appellant was violating FMC section 13-109.

The focus of our inquiry turns to whether Officer Kahn’s mistake of law was objectively reasonable under the facts of the case to support the probable cause to arrest appellant.

To be reasonable, the law upon which the mistake was made must be truly ambiguous. In this case, the court holds, it was not. The ordinance applies only to persons. Thus, the mistake-of-law reliance was unreasonable.

• Glover, 589 US ___, 140 SC 1183, ___ LE2 ___ (20) #18–556:

A Kansas deputy sheriff ran a license plate check on a pickup truck, discovering that the truck belonged to respondent Glover and that Glover’s driver’s license had been revoked. The deputy pulled the truck over because he assumed that Glover was driving. Glover was in fact driving and was charged with driving as a habitual violator.

He moved to suppress all evidence from the stop, claiming that the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion. The District Court granted the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The Kansas Supreme Court in turn reversed, holding that the deputy violated the Fourth Amendment by stopping Glover without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

In what they call a “narrow” holding, the U.S. Supreme Court holds that the stop was valid. The law is as follows:

• The Fourth Amendment permits an officer to initiate a brief investigative traffic stop when he has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.
• The level of suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and less than is necessary for probable cause.
• Officers are permitted to make commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.

Applying that, the majority opinion by Thomas, J., holds:

Before initiating the stop, Deputy Mehrer observed an individual operating a 1995 Chevrolet 1500 pickup truck with Kansas plate 295ATJ. He also knew that the registered owner of the truck had a revoked license and that the model of the truck matched the observed vehicle. From these three facts, Deputy Mehrer drew the commonsense inference that Glover was likely the driver of the vehicle, which provided more than reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop.

Ah, but what about an observation that tends to negate the above “reasonable suspicion”? The Court addresses that:

[T[he presence of additional facts might dispel reasonable suspicion … For example, if an officer knows that the registered owner of the vehicle is in his mid-sixties but observes that the driver is in her mid-twenties, then the totality of the circumstances would not “raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.” … Here, Deputy Mehrer possessed no exculpatory information—let alone sufficient information to rebut the reasonable inference that Glover was driving his own truck—and thus the stop was justified. (Citations omitted)

The lone dissenter was Sotomayor, J. who argued that this approach flips the burden of proof. The majority addressed this in a footnote:

The dissent argues that this approach impermissibly places the burden of proof on the individual to negate the inference of reasonable suspicion. Not so. As the above analysis makes clear, it is the information possessed by the officer at the time of the stop, not any information offered by the individual after the fact, that can negate the inference. (Emphasis in original)

DUI Arrestee Did Not Object to or Resist Blood Draw. Therefore, Consent

• Lopez, 46 CA5 317, 260 CR3 18 (20) #C080065:

Police detained defendant after observing her driving. An Officer Adams observed defendant’s unsteady gait, constricted pupils, and slurred speech. He conducted field sobriety tests that indicated she was impaired. He had her blow into a preliminary alcohol screening (PAS) device which registered .000, indicating an absence of alcohol. He believed she was under the influence of controlled substances, as opposed to alcohol. He arrested her and transported her to the county jail.

Adams sought a blood sample from defendant. At trial, he explained his procedure for obtaining a blood sample from DUI suspects as follows: “So what we’ll normally do is I’ll advise them that they’re required to, by law, to give a blood sample. We will transport them to the Placer County Jail, a phlebotomist will respond and take the blood sample, which I will witness. I will then take possession of the blood and book it into evidence.”

Adams stated he told defendant that “since she was under arrest for a DUI, and since I believed it was a controlled substance DUI, she’s required, by law, to submit to a blood test.” The officer said defendant did not refuse the blood test: “She consented and cooperated.” She did not object or resist at any point. If she had refused, he would have obtained a warrant and performed a forced blood draw.

Defendant’s motion to suppress was denied. The Court of Appeal, per Hull, Act. P. J., affirmed.

Defendant claimed there was insufficient evidence of voluntary consent, as Officer Adams did not provide the admonitions required by the implied consent law. Thus, any consent was merely her submission to a claim of lawful authority and any consent was coerced.

The question is one of “totality of the circumstances” to see if an arrestee’s actions imply actual consent. Here, they did:

Officer Adams correctly instructed defendant that she was required to undergo a blood test. Defendant did not object or refuse to undergo the test. She did not resist any of the officers’ directions or actions. She voluntarily placed her arm on the table to allow the phlebotomist to draw her blood.

A second argument from the defendant contended that her consent could not be voluntary because she submitted to Officer Adams’ misrepresentation of a lawful claim of authority. The officer told defendant she was required to give a blood sample. Defendant claims this statement was an order under authority of law, and it was a misstatement because case law requires either voluntary consent or a warrant.

The court did not buy it:

Officer Adams’s omission of the admonitions was one factor for the trial court to consider when it reviewed the totality of the circumstances. The omission did not deny defendant her right to withdraw her implied consent and compel her to consent. The court reviewed all of the circumstances and evidence, including Officer Adams’s omission, and it concluded defendant had actually consented to the blood draw. Substantial evidence supports its finding of fact.

• MENDOZA, 44 CA5 1044, 258 CR3 249 (20) #E071835

A jury convicted Def. of transporting for sale more than four kilograms of cocaine based on evidence a U.S. Customs and Border Protection agent acquired after a stop on Interstate 15. Def. sought to exclude the evidence, arguing the agent did not have reasonable suspicion she was engaged in criminal activity when he stopped her.

The agent said he decided to stop Def. because she was driving in a known smuggling corridor in a vehicle which had crossed the United States-Mexico border in the prior week; she slowed and changed lanes after he pulled alongside her in an unmarked car, rolled down his window, and stared at her; she drove at approximately 50 miles per hour to stay behind him; and she then refused to look at him when she ultimately passed him a few minutes later. The trial court held—albeit with reservations—that the stop was justified, and a jury later convicted her of transporting narcotics for sale. Mendoza appeals her conviction based only on the impropriety of the stop.

The trial court denied suppression. The Court of Appeal, per Slough, Act. P. J., reverses.

Clearly, driving on I-15 out of Mexico is not any ground for a stop. It was the other factors the agent relied on. But here the key fact was the agent was in an unmarked car.

The agent said he also considered the fact that Mendoza slowed and moved over behind him after he pulled alongside to inspect her vehicle. However, the manner of his approach is critical to evaluating Mendoza’s reaction. He acknowledged he drove an unmarked vehicle with no signs of its relation to law enforcement. As a result, when he pulled alongside her it was his conduct that looked suspicious, not hers. (Emphasis added)

The court concludes:

To initiate a stop, an agent must have an objectively reasonable basis for suspicion. The agent in this case did not have such a basis. Nothing about Mendoza’s car suggested she might be involved in criminal activity, and though she sought to avoid the agent, the evidence doesn’t suggest she knew he was law enforcement. That fact undercuts the agent’s inference that she was trying to avoid detection of criminal conduct, but given the setting, Mendoza’s reaction to being observed was so minor it wouldn’t provide adequate ground for suspicion even had the agent been driving a marked law enforcement vehicle. We therefore conclude the agent acted without a reasonable basis for suspicion when he stopped Mendoza, and the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress.

Parole Search of Cell Phone Upheld Under Totality of Circumstance

• Delrio, ___ CA5 ___, ___ CR3 ___ (20) #A154848

Residential burglary in Redwood City. Surveillance video from a neighbor’s house showed two individuals walking from a black truck to the burglarized house and then walking away, each carrying a sack. After the residents of the home reported the burglary, a deputy sheriff contacted Delrio and told him that a vehicle registered to him had been involved in a burglary. Def. denied any involvement, told the deputy that he had loaned the truck to a coworker, and claimed that if the truck was involved with a burglary, it must have been used without his permission.

The deputy viewed the surveillance video and concluded that one of the two individuals shown in the video had “a very close resemblance” Def., who was on parole.

Deputies conducted parole search of Def’s house and phone. Incriminating pics, and later Def. admitted the robbery.

His suppression motion was denied, and the Court of Appeal, per Fujisaki, J., affirmed.

Def. argued that the parole form used by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) did not check a box regarding “special conditions of parole” that would have required him to give his consent to, and any passwords for, searches of his electronic devices. Thus no notice of giving up his reasonable expectation of privacy in his phone.

The court found this argument to have “surface appeal,” but ultimately unconvincing.

As the California Supreme Court emphasized in Schmitz, Penal Code section 3067, subdivision (b)(3), provides that “every parolee is subject to warrantless and suspicionless parole searches,” and the reasonable scope of a parole search is not “strictly tied to the literal wording of the notification given to the parolee upon release.” (Schmitz, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 928.) Thus, while the reasonableness of a probation search has been held dependent on the literal wording of the notification given to a probationer, the reasonableness of a parole search does not derive from a theory of consent as has been found in probation search cases, but rather, is assessed based on the totality of the circumstances.

Re: the totality of circumstances:

Finally, we observe the cell phone search was not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing. (Reyes, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 752.) A search is arbitrary and capricious when the motivation for the search is unrelated to rehabilitative, reformative, or legitimate law enforcement purposes, or when the search is motivated by personal animosity toward the parolee. (In re Anthony S. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1004.) Because the officers here had specific reasons to suspect that defendant was involved in a residential burglary, the search was related to legitimate parole monitoring and law enforcement purposes, and there was no evidence suggesting the officers had personal animosity towards defendant. The search took place at a reasonable hour and was not unreasonably prolonged. (Reyes, at pp. 753–754.)

Also of Note…

• SMITH, ___ CA5 ___, ___ CR3 ___ (20) #D075372: Neighbor reported unoccupied car running in driveway. Off. thought someone might be hurt inside. Entered. Drugs, weapon in plain view. Supp. Den. Rev. No facts indicating emergency medical or exigency.

However, as required by Ovieda, supra, 7 Cal.5th 1034, the officer pointed to no facts that reasonably supported his concern that someone inside the residence might be suffering from a medical emergency such as moaning or groaning from inside the home, blood or vomit near the vehicle or residence, or disarray inside the vehicle or near the home. Rather, the facts known to the officer were insufficient to provide him with ” ‘an objectively reasonable basis for believing’ that medical assistance was needed, or persons were in danger” such that a warrantless search of the residence was justified by the emergency aid exception.

• SHUMAKE, ___ CA5 ___, ___ CR3 ___ (20) Appellate Div. #6093: Offs pulled Def. over for license plate. Smelled MJ. Def. said he had “bud” in container. A little over 1 oz. Off. searched car. Pistol under seat. Supp. Den. Rev. Legal amount of MJ did not give rise to P-C to search.

• LEE, 40 CA5 853, 253 CR3 512 (19) #D073740

Following a traffic stop, officers asked Def. for license, which he did not have. Ordered out and patted down. A small amount of marijuana was in his pocket.

Offs then searched Lee’s car without a warrant and discovered 56 grams of cocaine, a firearm, and other items associated with selling narcotics. After Lee was charged with various drug and weapons offenses, he filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless vehicle search. The trial court granted Lee’s motion, rejecting the People’s contentions that the search was proper under the automobile exception as supported by probable cause or, alternatively, as an inventory search of a vehicle following an impound.

The Court of Appeal, per Dato, J., affirmed.

Last year, Fews, 27 CA5 553, 238 CR3 337 (18) #A151727, held that even after Prop. 64, a legal amount of marijuana possessed during an auto stop could provide probable cause to search the vehicle if other factors give rise to an inference of unlawful activity. In Fews, the odor of MJ, “furtive movements,” and a blunt in the driver’s hands indicated driving UI or with an “open container” of MJ.

Here, however:

With the passage of Proposition 64 by voters in 2016, California law now permits adults 21 years of age and older to legally possess up to 28.5 grams, or about one ounce, of marijuana. (§ 11362.1, subd. (a)(1).) Critically, the statute expressly provides that “[c]annabis and cannabis products involved in any way with conduct deemed lawful by this section are not contraband nor subject to seizure, and no conduct deemed lawful by this section shall constitute the basis for detention, search, or arrest.” (§ 11362.1, subd. (c), italics added.) … California law now specifically states that up to one ounce of marijuana possessed by an adult age 21 or over is not contraband.

***

If by this argument the People mean simply that possession of a small (legal) amount of marijuana does not foreclose the possibility that defendant possesses a larger (illegal) amount, they are obviously correct. But there must be evidence—that is, additional evidence beyond the mere possession of a legal amount—that would cause a reasonable person to believe the defendant has more marijuana. (Emphasis in original.)

The People also argued that the search was valid as an inventory search. But the court rejected this:

We likewise find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that the search was not valid as an inventory search. The search here served no community caretaking function. And based on the manner in which the search was conducted and the statements of the officer to Lee and his passenger, the trial court reasonably found that the primary purpose of the search was not to inventory the contents of Lee’s car, but rather to investigate Lee for possible criminal behavior. (Emphasis in original.)

Patdown of Robbery Suspect Invalid Without Facts Indicating Armed and Dangerous

• JEREMIAH S., ___ CA5 ___, 254 CR3 88 (19) #A155856

San Francisco woman robbed of her purse and iPhone by “two young black men” wearing hoodies. Police used the Find My iPhone app to locate the phone by Pier 19. Offs on patrol picked up the dispatch. The offs spotted two minors matching the description and detained them. There was no sign of a weapon on Def., but the Off patted him down because “a robbery occurred” and he knew that “most robberies involve a weapon or most robbers tend to have weapons on their persons.” Off recovered the stolen iPhone.

Def’s motion to suppress was denied. The Court of Appeal, per Fujisaki, J., reversed.

Based on our independent review of the undisputed facts, we conclude the officer who conducted the patsearch did not present specific and articulable facts to support a reasonable suspicion that Jeremiah was armed and dangerous. In so concluding, we decline to recognize a rule that would essentially validate any patsearch of a suspected robber who is lawfully detained following a report of a fresh robbery, regardless of the particular circumstances.

So what sorts of articulable facts should be considered?

Considerations relevant to this inquiry typically include visible bulges or baggy clothing that suggest a hidden weapon; sudden movements or attempts to reach for an object that is not immediately visible; evasive and deceptive responses to an officer’s questions about what the individual was doing; and unnatural hand postures that suggest an effort to conceal a weapon…Other relevant circumstances can include the type of crime at issue; the detained individual’s suspected involvement in such a crime; and the searching officer’s experience with such crimes and their associated weapon use in the particular location of the detention. [Citations omitted].

Seizing Defendant’s Dash Cam Valid Under Exigent Circumstances

• Tran, ___ CA5 ___, ___ CR3 ___ (19) #D074605

Def was involved in a collision with a motorcycle when his car crossed a double yellow line on a sharp curve in the road. At the time of the accident, the motorcycle rider sustained serious injuries, and it was believed that he could die from those injuries.

Arriving Off approached Def who was sitting on the side of the road with a backpack. Off asked Def if he had a dashboard camera. Def admitted he had one. Off then asked if he had removed the camera from his vehicle, and Def stated he had. Off asked where it was, and Def said in his backpack. Off asked Def to get it and give it to him, fearing that Def might somehow destroy the video evidence on the dash cam.

Offs later secured a search warrant to examine the dash cam evidence. Def was charged with reckless driving. He moved to suppress the dash cam evidence. Denied.

The Court of Appeal, per Huffman, Acting P.J., affirmed.

The People argued that the seizure of the evidence was valid under the exigent circumstances (possible destruction of evidence). The court agreed:

Based on the record before us, we conclude that all the circumstances, and the rational inferences stemming from them, existing at the time Palmer seized the dashboard camera would have caused a reasonable officer to believe that immediate acquisition of the camera was necessary to preserve the potential evidence on it. Palmer’s testimony at the suppression hearing supports a rational inference that the camera contained footage of Tran driving. Palmer further relied on his investigation of the scene, his experience in dealing with high-performance cars with dashboard cameras, his knowledge of dashboard cameras, the fact Tran removed the camera from the car and placed it in his backpack, and Tran’s hesitancy in providing the camera to conclude he must seize the camera to prevent the destruction of evidence. His response was objectively reasonable.

• OVIEDA, 7 C5 1034, 250 CR3 754, 446 P3 262 (19):

In People v. Ray (1999) 21 Cal.4th 464, the California Supreme Court articulated a “community caretaking” exception to the warrant requirement for government entry into a private residence.

Ray held that “circumstances short of a perceived emergency may justify a warrantless entry” into a home.

The Court now overturns that part of Ray, holding that Under United States Supreme Court authority recognizes “exigent circumstances” as an exception, but not community caretaking.

FACTS:

Officers were dispatched to Def’s home in Santa Barbara after family members reported he was suicidal and had access to a handgun. Five officers responded and set up a perimeter. They learned defendant was inside with two friends, Trevor Case and his wife, Amber.

Case came out and told officers that he and his wife disarmed Def, then Case took the handgun, two rifles, and ammunition and put them in the garage.

Then Amber came out with Def. He was cuffed and searched.

Officers Corbett and Bruce entered the home to do a “protective sweep to secure the premises” and make sure there was no one else inside who might be armed, injured, or in need of aid. During the sweep, Corbett noted “an overwhelmingly strong odor of marijuana” and numerous items related to “marijuana cultivation and concentrated cannabis production.” He also saw ammo, a gun case, scales, and a large industrial drying oven with ducts leading to the garage.

More officers were called to the scene. No search warrant was ever obtained. Large quantities of ammo and drug-producing equipment were removed from the house and garage. Recovered weaponry included a submachine gun and a rifle with a long-range scope.

Defendant was charged with manufacturing a controlled substance, importing an assault weapon, and possessing a silencer and short-barreled rifle. He moved to suppress the evidence found in his home. The court denied the motion, and a divided Court of Appeal upheld the search via the “community caretaking exception.”

The California Supreme Court, per Corrigan, J., reverses. The decision analyzes Ray and subsequent cases, and United States Supreme Court precedent. The conclusion is simple:

In sum, the community caretaking exception asserted in the absence of exigency is not one of the carefully delineated exceptions to the residential warrant requirement recognized by the United States Supreme Court. To date, that court has only recognized community caretaking searches in the context of vehicle impound procedures.

***

We conclude that an entry for reasons short of a perceived emergency, or similar exigency, fails to satisfy the relevant constitutional standard.

 

Flight + High Crime Area (Without More) ≠ Reasonable Suspicion

• FLORES, 38 CA5 617, ___ CR3 ___ (19) #G055861:

On a weekday afternoon, seven officers went to an alleyway claimed by the “Looney Tunes Crew,” also known as the “LTK” street gang. The team approached via both ends of the alley. Def. started running away, made eye contact with an officer, and slowed down. He was detained.

Off noticed a bulge in Def’s sock. Def. gave it up. It was Meth. A later search of Def’s apartment was conducted without consent, and more meth was found.

Def. moved to suppress. The court granted suppression re: the evidence from the apartment. But the original detention and statements made by Def were admitted because there was both “flight” at the sight of police, and it was a “high crime area.” The court cited Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119 for support.

The Court of Appeal, Per Thompson, J., reverses.

“[T]he Supreme Court has never endorsed a per se rule that flight establishes reasonable suspicion to detain. Instead, flight is but one relevant factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis.”

Reasonable suspicion requires “flight-plus” other circumstances. One of these is “high crime area” as in Souza, 9 C4 224 (94). But the court here distinguishes Souza because there the contact was at night. Here it was in the daytime.

So while the People argued for a bright-line rule of Flight + High Crime Area = Reasonable Suspicion, the court didn’t not go for it:

Wardlow fails to provide the People with the necessary support needed to justify defendant’s initial seizure. Consequently, the People failed to meet their burden to show specific, articulable grounds to justify detaining defendant. As such, the evidence obtained from defendant immediately following his detention was unlawfully obtained and should have been suppressed.

 

Officer Testimony About Surveillance Videos Adequate for Establishing P-C to Arrest

• Alexander, 36 CA5 827, 248 CR3 564 (19) #A151809:

SF Police sergeant investigated a series of ten robberies in August and September 2012. The suspects were two African-American males, one taller and thinner than the other. Off obtained police reports regarding all of the incidents and surveillance videos of eight of the incidents. He viewed and compared the videos multiple times.

Responding to a dispatch about another robbery, Off arrived in the general area in an unmarked vehicle about twenty minutes after the broadcast and observed two men cross the street about twelve feet in front of him. He “immediately recognized” them as the suspects in the robberies he had been investigating.

Off called for backup, followed Defs for a short distance, and then apprehended them at gunpoint. He searched a black bag and found two stolen cell phones. Another officer found car keys that were connected to a white Chevy that looked like the getaway car in one of the robbery videos. Off searched the vehicle and found a black replica handgun and a dark-colored beanie cap.

Defs moved to suppress. Denied. The Court of Appeal, per Simons, J., affirmed the denial.

Defs argued that the Officer’s testimony about the videos was hearsay, and therefore could be used as a basis for probable cause. The court did not agree.

In the present case, Sergeant Maguire’s testimony about how he obtained the surveillance videos and what he observed in the videos was not admitted to prove the videos depicted the robberies or to prove the content of the videos. Instead, the testimony was admitted to inform the trial court of the basis for Maguire’s belief he had probable cause to arrest appellants.

***

Sergeant Maguire testified under oath about surveillance videos of seven robberies. Maguire did not have personal knowledge of the robberies or how the videos were made, but there is little reason to doubt the videos depict the robberies under investigation.

• Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 588 US ___ (19) #18-6210:

Mitchell was found staggering near a lake and a van. Officers gave him a preliminary breath test which came out 0.24%. They took him to the police station, but he was too “lethargic” to give a breath test. So they drove him to a hospital.

Mitchell lost consciousness on the ride over and had to be wheeled in. The officer read aloud to a slumped Mitchell the standard statement giving drivers a chance to refuse BAC testing. Hearing no response, Jaeger asked hospital staff to draw a blood sample. Mitchell remained unconscious while the sample was taken, and analysis of his blood showed that his BAC, about 90 minutes after his arrest, was 0.22%.

Mitchell moved to suppress the test, as it was conducted without a warrant. The trail court denied. Eventually the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the conviction. The U.S. Supreme Court took the case to decide whether a warrantless blood draw from an unconscious motorist is valid.

Short answer: Yes. When a driver is unconscious, the newly announced “general rule” is that a warrant is not required.

Two previous cases came into the discussion: McNeely 569 US 141 (13) and Schmerber 384 US 757 (66). In the words of the majority opinion (by Alito, J.):

We have also reviewed BAC tests under the “exigent circumstances” exception—which, as noted, allows warrantless searches “to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.” Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U. S. 141, 149 (2013). In McNeely, we were asked if this exception covers BAC testing of drunk-driving suspects in light of the fact that blood-alcohol evidence is always dissipating due to “natural metabolic processes.” Id., at 152. We answered that the fleeting quality of BAC evidence alone is not enough. Id., at 156. But in Schmerber it did justify a blood test of a drunk driver who had gotten into a car accident that gave police other pressing duties, for then the “further delay” caused by a warrant application really “would have threatened the destruction of evidence.” McNeely, supra, at 152 (emphasis added).

Like Schmerber, this case sits much higher than McNeely on the exigency spectrum. McNeely was about the minimum degree of urgency common to all drunk- driving cases. In Schmerber, a car accident heightened that urgency. And here Mitchell’s medical condition did just the same.

The general rule is now as follows:

[E]xigency exists when (1) BAC evidence is dissipating and (2) some other factor creates pressing health, safety, or law enforcement needs that would take priority over a warrant application. Both conditions are met when a drunk-driving suspect is unconscious, so Schmerber controls: With such suspects, too, a warrantless blood draw is lawful.

There is, however, a possible exception!

We do not rule out the possibility that in an unusual case a defendant would be able to show that his blood would not have been drawn if police had not been seeking BAC information, and that police could not have reasonably judged that a warrant application would interfere with other pressing needs or duties.

For this reason, the case was remanded back to Wisconsin to give Mitchell the opportunity to show these two conditions.

Gotta admit, this is confusing. A defendant would have to show that blood would not have been drawn at the hospital but for the police wanting BAC evidence. So he’d have to prove that a hospital emergency room does not routinely take a blood sample when an unconscious person is brought in for help. Then, step two, he’d have to show police acted unreasonably in ignoring a warrant application due to the “pressing needs” of the situation. Good luck with that, but there you have it.

Why the gymnastics? Justice Thomas, in dissent, argues that it’s because the Court didn’t want to overturn McNeely which was, according to Thomas, wrongly decided (McNeely held that the dissipation of BAC evidence alone was not an exigent circumstance).

In any event, this case did not take up the question of whether Wisconsin’s implied consent law would have allowed the blood draw here. That’s a question currently pending in our own state Supreme Court. See People v. Arredondo, S233582.

Police Spotlighting Parked Car Was a Detention

• KIDD, 36 CA5 12, 248 CR3 234 (19) #E070996:

Officer on patrol observed a car parked on a residential street with its front amber fog lights on. He could see two individuals sitting in the car. He decided to make contact, later explaining “there’s a couple people inside of this car parked on the road at 1:30 in the morning. Maybe I should check to see if they’re stranded, or what exactly they’re doing. If, you know, who they are, if they live here.”

The officer passed the car, made a U-turn, and parked about 10 feet behind the car, which had another car parked about 10 feet in front of it. He pointed two spotlights—one by his driver’s side mirror, the other on the overhead light bar (but not the colored lights)—at the occupied car, and then exited his patrol vehicle.

As he approached, he smelled marijuana. He flashlighted the interior and saw the passenger “attempting to conceal” what he thought were baggies of marijuana. He asked if either of the occupants was on parole or probation. Kidd said he was on probation The officer directed the two occupants to exit the car and to sit in his patrol vehicle while he verified Kidd’s probation terms. While the officer did so, Kidd spontaneously told the officer that there was a firearm inside the car’s center console. The officer confirmed that Kidd was on probation and that he was subject to a search condition. He then searched the car and discovered marijuana, later determined to total 26 ounces, in several different packages; a digital scale; a pistol with the serial number scratched off; a loaded magazine for the pistol; and 142 pills later identified as Alprazolam.

Kidd’s motion to suppress was denied prior to trial, but granted on a later motion to set aside the information, per PC 995. The Court of Appeal, per Raphael, J., affirms.

Taking into account the totality of the circumstances, we find that Kidd was detained when the officer made a U-turn to pull in behind him and trained spotlights on his car. The officer did not block Kidd’s car in, and he did not illuminate his colored emergency lights, so as to unambiguously signal a detention. Nevertheless, motorists are trained to yield immediately when a law enforcement vehicle pulls in behind them and turns on its lights. Regardless of the color of the lights the officer turned on, a reasonable person in Kidd’s circumstances “would expect that if he drove off, the officer would respond by following with red light on and siren sounding . . . .” (People v. Bailey, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 406.) Moreover, any ambiguity was removed when the officer more or less immediately exited his patrol vehicle and began to approach Kidd’s car. Although the officer’s approach was, according to record, not made in a particularly aggressive or intimidating manner, a reasonable person in Kidd’s circumstances would not have felt free to leave.

• Chamagua, 33 CA5 925, 245 CR 523 (19) #B290057:

Sheriff’s Deputy Gorski testified he and his partner were patrolling in a marked patrol car one night when they spotted Def walking along, but then immediately changed direction and quickly walked into an apartment complex driveway. Def. put something in his pocket. Gorski pulled the patrol car “just slightly” into the driveway, alongside Def. The officers got out and Gorski asked Def, “Hey, how are you doing? What’s your name? Do you got [sic] anything illegal on you?”

Def. said, “I have a pipe on me.” Gorski searched Def. and found a pipe with traces of crystal methamphetamine. Gorski asked, “Hey, you know, anything else illegal that you have on you?” Def. said, “Yeah, I have a bunch of meth on me.” Gorski searched Chamagua’s pocket and found a ping-pong-sized ball of crystal meth inside a transparent green container

Def. then admitted he was going to a party to sell the meth to support his own habit. He was arrested, and his motion to suppress was denied.

The Court of Appeal, per Wiley, J., affirmed.

This issue in cases like this is whether a reasonable person would feel they were being detained by a “show of force” by officers.

Def’s rendition of the events was found not to be credible by the trial court. Thus, for this appeal, the court accepted only Gorski’s testimony.

The deputies did not use or threaten physical force. They did not command Chamagua to do anything. They simply asked questions.

Asking questions, including incriminating questions, does not turn an encounter into a detention. (See Florida v. Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 439.)

People targeted for police questioning rightly might believe themselves the object of official scrutiny. Such directed scrutiny, however, is not a detention. (People v. Franklin (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 935, 940.)

Chamagua argues from People v. Lopez that Gorski’s questions were sufficiently accusatory to turn the encounter into a detention. (People v. Lopez (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 289, 292–293.) But that opinion held an encounter was consensual and was not a detention.

Chamagua cites People v. Ramirez to argue police blocked him from leaving the area. (People v. Ramirez (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 849, 852.) Ramirez was different. An officer ordered Ramirez, who was walking, to “hold on” and to put his hands on his head. (Ibid.) When officers order you to halt, to stand still, and to assume a position typically associated with arrest, they show police authority. By contrast, this case has no police orders and no shows of authority. Gorski simply asked Chamagua questions.

Chamagua stresses the encounter was at night. Sundown does not remove the power of free consent.

Warrantless, Forcible Blood Draw Valid Under Probation Search Conditions

• Cruz, ___ CA5 ___, ___ CR3 ___ (19) #F074667:

Def. was arrested for DUI. He was on felony probation from a previous DUI. Included in the conditions of probation were the following:

• Submit your person, vehicle, place of residence or any other belongings to search and seizure, without a warrant, any time day or night, by any Probation Officer and/or Peace Officer, with or without probable cause.
• If arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of Section 23152 or 23153 of the Vehicle Code, shall not refuse to submit to a chemical test of your blood, breath or urine.

Def. refused to take a test, so was transported to a hospital for a forcible blood draw, showing a 0.157 BAC.

Prior to his preliminary hearing, Def. moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the blood draw, on the ground the warrantless invasion of his bodily integrity, undertaken without his consent, violated the Fourth Amendment. The magistrate ruled the terms and conditions of defendant’s felony probation justified the nonconsensual blood draw, and so denied the motion.

Following the filing of the information, defendant renewed his motion. Denied. A No Contest plea was entered, and this appeal followed.

The Court of Appeal, per Detjen, J., affirmed.

The California Supreme Court has not yet determined whether a general probation search condition authorizes a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw … Here, however, defendant was not merely subject to California’s implied consent law or a general probation search condition requiring that he submit his person, vehicle, place of residence, and belongings to search and seizure. Rather, he expressly agreed that if he was arrested for drunk driving, he would not refuse to submit to a chemical test of his blood. Because of this, his challenge to the validity of the search and seizure fails.

The court distinguished this case from those arguing exigent circumstances or incident to arrest to justify the search.

Defendant points to McNeely, Birchfield, and Schmitz….As we previously observed, McNeely addressed the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. (McNeely, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 145.) Schmitz was concerned with a warrantless parole search, and noted the “clear distinction between probation and parole with regard to consent.” (Schmitz, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 920.) Birchfield addressed searches incident to arrest. (Birchfield, supra, 579 U.S. at p. ___ [136 S.Ct. at p. 2184].)

Keep an Eye on:

• In re J.G., 33 CA5 1084, 245 CR3 587 (19) #B287487:

The juvenile court has broad discretion when it comes to imposing probation search conditions. But how far can they extend to electronic devices? That issue is currently pending in the California Supreme Court. See, e.g., In re Ricardo P. (2015) #S23092 (requiring disclosure of minor’s passwords to electronic devices was unconstitutionally overbroad because it was not narrowly tailored to limit impact on minor’s privacy rights).

In J.G., the trial court granted probation on a number of conditions, including that J.G. shall, “Submit any electronic device, used to store or transmit digital information, that you own, possess or control, to a search of any source of electronic data identified below, at any time, with or without probable cause, by a peace officer, and provide the peace officer with any passwords necessary to access the data source specified.”

Sources of electronic data identified in the probation condition were: text messages, voicemail messages, call logs, photographs, email accounts, social media accounts and internet browsing history.

Does that sound overbroad? No, says the court. “This kid is in trouble. He needs guidance. He does not need to access racial hatred which is so readily available on the internet.”

[see also People v. Bryant (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 396, review granted June 28, 2017; People v. Nachbar (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1122, review granted Dec. 14, 2016; In re J.E. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 795, review granted Oct. 12, 2016.]

• Pride, 31 CA5 133, 242 CR3 297 (18) #SCD272182:

The victim, D.C., got off a trolley in San Diego. He was wearing red Jordan shoes, a hat, a gold chain, and two watches.

D.C. spoke to some men who were looking for a party. D.C. invited them to his hotel and told them he was looking for marijuana. He followed the men into a parking lot where another group of men was standing. D.C. asked where he could get some marijuana. Someone yelled, “This is West Coast” and then pummeled D.C.and took his shoes, hat, iPad, money, watches, and chain.

D.C. called 911. He reported a male with a scar along his jawline was among the individuals involved in the incident. A gang unit detective thought the suspect could be one Chaz Pride. The detective found a video Pride posted on a social media account shortly after the robbery depicting Pride wearing a gold chain around his neck saying, “Check out the new chain, dog.”

A few days later, officers executed a search warrant at Pride’s residence where several items associated with the robbery of D.C. were recovered. A debit card with D.C.’s name on it was recovered on the top shelf of a closet in Pride’s residence. The jacket Pride was wearing in the video was also recovered. When Pride was arrested, he was wearing D.C.’s gold chain.

Pride moved to suppress the video before it was played for the jury. He argued that the detective obtained the video without a warrant by portraying himself as a “friend” to gain access to Pride’s social media account. The court ruled the video was not illegally obtained and there is “no expectation of privacy” when one puts something out “into the ether.”

The Court of Appeal, per McConnell, P. J., affirmed.

Pride voluntarily shared with his social media “friends” a video of himself wearing the chain stolen from D.C. The fact he chose a social media platform where posts disappear after a period of time did not raise his expectation of privacy. Rather, in posting the video message, Pride assumed the risk that the account for one of his “friends” could be an undercover profile for a police detective or that any other “friend” could save and share the information with government officials. As such, there is no Fourth Amendment violation.

Taint of Unlawful DNA Swab Attenuated Over Time With Intervening Circumstances

• Marquez, 31 CA5 402, 242 CR3 530 (19) #G048762:

In 2006, police arrested defendant Marquez in Ventura County on a drug possession offense. Without Marquez’s consent, authorities collected his DNA sample and entered his DNA profile into a statewide database, but Marquez was never charged with the drug offense.

In 2008, investigators retrieved DNA evidence from an Orange County robbery, and that evidence matched Marquez’s DNA profile in the database (a “cold hit”). Police contacted Marquez, and with his consent they collected a second DNA sample, which matched the DNA evidence from the robbery.

Marquez moved to suppress the 2008 DNA evidence as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Motion was denied.

The Court of Appeal, per Moore, J., affirmed.

First, the 2006 DNA collection was unlawful because the prosecution did not meet its burden to prove that Marquez had been validly arrested. The court cited the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Maryland v. King, 569 US 435 (2013) in which it established…

… a new exception to the warrant requirement, largely relying on the existing search incident to arrest and booking exceptions: “When officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense and they bring the suspect to the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”

***

In any event, it is a reasonable inference that at the time of his arrest in 2006, there were no reasonable grounds to believe that he was guilty of any “serious” or “jailable” crimes.

But what about the 2008 DNA swab? Admissible, says the court, as “it was sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful 2006 collection of Marquez’s DNA sample.”

The Supreme Court has identified three factors that are used to determine whether the illegality (the poisonous tree) has become sufficiently attenuated to permit the admission of the obtained evidence (the fruit)… First, courts consider the “‘temporal proximity’ between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence to determine how closely the discovery of evidence followed the unconstitutional search”; this factor only favors attenuation if “‘substantial time’” has elapsed… Second, courts consider “the presence of intervening circumstances.” … “Third . . . [courts] examine ‘the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.’”

***

First, as to temporal proximity, a substantial period of time (about two years) had elapsed between the unlawful collection of Marquez’s DNA sample in 2006 and the lawful collection of DNA evidence in 2008. (Compare Brendlin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 270 [temporal proximity of “only a few minutes”].) Second, as to intervening circumstances, between 2006 and 2008, Marquez had been arrested at least three times and had been ordered to submit to DNA testing on each occasion; moreover, at the time of Marquez’s 2008 DNA collection, he was on felony probation and consented to the cheek swab. Finally, as far as the flagrancy of the misconduct, while the Attorney General concedes that the authorities were not statutorily authorized to collect Marquez’s DNA in 2006, there is nothing to indicate that they acted with an improper motive, or that they somehow obtained the DNA sample in an inappropriate manner.

A Lawyer’s Letter to a Son

Back in 1972 my big brother, Bob, was having thoughts about becoming a lawyer like our dad, Art Bell.

Bob was, at the time, a teacher at an elementary school in northern California. So he wrote Dad a letter—a real letter, on paper, with an envelope and a stamp!—asking for Dad’s counsel.

And Dad, never one to do things (like represent a client) halfway, wrote a long letter in response.

Dad thought his modest epistle might be something other lawyers would find of value. So he paid to have it published in installments in the Los Angeles Daily Journal.

It was a huge hit. The demand for copies proved so great that Dad had the whole thing printed up and paid for it to be included as an insert in a later edition of the Journal.

It exposits a view of the law that is rare today: as an honorable profession, not just a way to get money or power.

We’ve just republished it as an ebook and in print. You can check it out by going HERE.