- LEAL, 93 CA5 1143, 311 CR3 540 (23) #C096463
Officers were surveilling a funeral because they expected a criminal street gang connected to prior shootings to be in attendance. An officer observed a juvenile walking and holding his pants up; he later observed a black handgun in his waistband. The juvenile got in Def’s car and lay down, then got out, appearing not to have the weapon. Off thought the juvenile had slipped the gun under the seat.
Defendant drove his car to a barbershop. Another officer detained him and said he was going to search his car. When he didn’t find a gun under the passenger seat, he decided to search the trunk. There he found a loaded Glock handgun.
Def moved to suppress. Denied. The Court of Appeal, per Robie, J., reverses.
A survey of cases applying the automobile exception reveals courts generally find warrantless searches of trunks and other enclosed compartments in a vehicle justified in three categories of circumstances: (1) officers have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence of a crime will be found specifically in the trunk or other enclosed compartment; (2) a search of the passenger compartment reveals contraband or other evidence generating further probable cause to search the trunk or other enclosed compartment; or (3) probable cause exists as to the entire car (i.e., that the contraband or evidence of a crime will be found somewhere in the car). The search of the trunk here does not fit within any of these categories.
Holding:
We hold that when an officer has probable cause to believe contraband or evidence of a crime will be found specifically in the passenger compartment of a vehicle (as compared to having probable cause to believe it will be found somewhere in the vehicle), and no other subsequent discovery or information provides further probable cause to believe the evidence will be found in the trunk, an officer’s search of the trunk exceeds the permissible scope of a warrantless search under the automobile exception.
Descriptions of Child Porn Were Adequate to Establish P-C
- Wadleigh, 93 CA5 531, 310 CR3 948 (23) #A165017
Two search warrants issued re: child porn. In the affidavit, no images were attached, only four descriptions of the images. Def. moved to suppress, arguing that the warrants authorizing the two searches were invalid because their descriptions of four images in his electronic accounts lacked sufficient factual detail from which the magistrate could determine that (1) the subjects were minors and (2) the images depicted sexual conduct within the meaning of section 311.4, subdivision (d)(1).
1538.5 denial affirmed.
The court agreed with Wadleigh that the preferred course of action in such matters would be to attach actual images. However, there was enough info in the descriptions to establish P-C:
[W]e agree with Wadleigh that “a neutral and detached magistrate” (Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 240), should in general view suspected images of child pornography and make the ultimate determination that the depicted individuals are minors. On the facts here, however, we conclude that the magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude the images depicted minors.
There was a Franks issue regarding the description of the first of the images. Under Franks v. Delaware 438 US 154 (78), the Supreme Court held that, where a “defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included . . . in [a] warrant affidavit,” and then proves the statement was reckless or intentional, “the affidavit’s false material [is] set to one side.” . . . If “the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded . . . .”
The court here concluded that, setting the first image to one side, the other descriptions established probable cause for the searches.
Auto Stop for Registration Was Unduly Prolonged
- SUGGS, 93 CA5 1369, 311 CR3 739 (23) #C096555
Def’s car was stopped for having paper plates, and Off not seeing paperwork displayed in the window as required by law. On approach, the Off did see the paperwork attached to the darkly tinted window. He proceeded to question Def and passenger, ask for ID, and if there was anything “crazy” in the car. He also asked about probation status.
Off then asked for consent to search the car. Def declined. Off went back to his patrol vehicle then returned and informed Def and his passenger that they both had suspended licenses, the passenger was on probation for “possession of firearms stuff and a couple other things,” and he was going to conduct a probation search.
The search turned up a concealed firearm and ammunition in a satchel on the floor behind Def’s seat that was within the passenger’s reach. Based on that discovery, Off searched the entire vehicle and found a scale and a cigarette box holding 30 pills of a controlled substance in a compartment near the steering wheel.
Def’s motion to suppress was denied. The Court of Appeal, per Boulware Eurie, J., reverses.
We agree the detention became unlawful when (1) the purpose of the stop completely dissipated (when the officer saw the documents in the window and thus realized that defendant had not committed the Vehicle Code violation that was the purpose of the stop), and (2) the officer then made inquiries aimed at finding evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.
GPS Tracker Placed on Car Was Permissible as Parole Search
- Session, 93 CA5 723, 311 CR3 363 (23) #G060536
String of burglaries in Orange County. Offs stopped white BMW with Def driving. Off placed a GPS tracking device on the car before allowing it to leave. Car was later stopped after a chase. Phones and other items linked to burglaries were recovered.
Def moved to suppress, arguing that placing the GPS tracker was an impermissible warrantless search because the Off’s knowledge of his parole statues was “vague or uncorroborated.” Denied. Affirmed by the Court of Appeal, per Moore, J.
[W]hen a defendant is on parole, the source of the officer’s knowledge is not legally meaningful. Defendant, in support of the contention that the officer’s knowledge must come from an official source, relies primarily on a case involving a probationer, not a parolee. (People v. Romeo (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 93)