- COLLINS, 584 US ___, 138 SC 1663, ___ LE2 ___ (18) #16-1027
The facts of the case are simple. During an investigation of two traffic incidents involving an orange-and-black motorcycle, Virginia police officer Rhodes learned that the motorcycle likely was stolen and in the possession of petitioner Collins.
Officer Rhodes discovered photographs on Collins’ Facebook profile of an orange-and-black motorcycle parked in the driveway of a house. (Note to scofflaws: stay off of social media.)
Rhodes drove to the house, and parked on the street. From there, he could see what appeared to be a motorcycle under a white tarp parked in the same location as the motorcycle in the photograph. Without a search warrant, Rhodes walked to the top of the driveway, removed the tarp, confirmed that the motorcycle was stolen by running the license plate and vehicle identification numbers. He took a photo of the uncovered motorcycle, replaced the tarp, and returned to his car to wait for Collins.
When Collins returned, Rhodes arrested him. The trial court denied Collins’ motion to suppress and Collins was convicted of receiving stolen property.
The Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed. The State Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that the warrantless search was justified under the Fourth Amendment’s automobile exception.
The Supreme Court, in an 8-1 decision, reversed and remanded.
The Court refused to expand the automobile exception to the curtilage of a home. Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor said:
Just as an officer must have a lawful right of access to any contraband he discovers in plain view in order to seize it without a warrant, and just as an officer must have a lawful right of access in order to arrest a person in his home, so, too, an officer must have a lawful right of access to a vehicle in order to search it pursuant to the automobile exception. The automobile exception does not afford the necessary lawful right of access to search a vehicle parked within a home or its curtilage because it does not justify an intrusion on a person’s separate and substantial Fourth Amendment interest in his home and curtilage.
Justice Thomas, while concurring in the decision, floated the idea that it was time to “revisit” the exclusionary rule. Ahem.
Justice Alito was the lone dissenter. He asserts that what the officer did was perfectly reasonable and even though it was within the curtilage, the action “impaired no real privacy interests.” He was answered by the majority in a lengthy footnote that basically says, Dude, this was private property here, not a public street.
To paraphrase Clint Eastwood: Get off my driveway.
Prosecution Needs Search Warrant to Obtain Cell Site Location Information
- CARPENTER, 585 US ___, 138 SC 2206, ___ LE2 ___ (18) #16-402
The FBI identified the cell phone numbers of several robbery suspects. Prosecutors were granted court orders to obtain the suspects’ cell phone records under the Stored Communications Act. Wireless carriers produced CSLI for petitioner Timothy Carpenter’s phone, and the Government was able to obtain 12,898 location points cataloging Carpenter’s movements over 127 days—an average of 101 data points per day.
Carpenter moved to suppress the data, arguing that the Government’s seizure of the records without obtaining a warrant supported by probable cause violated the Fourth Amendment. The District Court denied the motion, and prosecutors used the records at trial to show that Carpenter’s phone was near four of the robbery locations at the time those robberies occurred. Carpenter was convicted. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Carpenter lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location information collected by the FBI because he had shared that information with his wireless carriers.
The United States Supreme Court reversed 5-4, with Chief Justice Roberts writing the majority opinion joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan.
The Court holds that acquisition of cell-site records is a Fourth Amendment search. Therefore a warrant, supported by probable cause, must be obtained.
But CJ Roberts added the following:
Our decision today is a narrow one. We do not express a view on matters not before us: real-time CSLI or “tower dumps” (a download of information on all the devices that connected to a particular cell site during a particular interval). We do not … call into question conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras. Nor do we address other business records that might incidentally reveal location information. Further, our opinion does not consider other collection techniques involving foreign affairs or national security. As Justice Frankfurter noted when considering new innovations in airplanes and radios, the Court must tread carefully in such cases, to ensure that we do not “embarrass the future.”
There were four dissenting opinions filed. But four does not beat five.
Warrantless Blood Draw of Injured UI Driver Violated 4th
- MEZA, 23 CA5 604, 232 CR3 894 (18) #A147188:
Def. was in a car accident with his girlfriend. At the hospital his blood was drawn per procedure. Off. noticed “odor of alcohol” and informed Def. another blood draw would be taken by forensic expert. Def. said, “Okay.” Off. did not seek a warrant. Trial court denied suppression motion.
The Court of Appeal, per Tucher, J., held the second blood draw was a 4th violation. Under McNEELY, 133 SC 1552 (13): “In those drunk-driving investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so.”
Conviction was upheld, however, through harmless error. The first blood draw by the hospital was permissible because that’s what they do with all trauma patients.
Note: the court distinguished Toure, 232 CA4 1096 (15), because there Def. was violent, and court closings impacted time to get warrant.