• NGUYEN, 12 CA5 574, 219 CR3 124 (17) #H042795:
Police identified an IP address for an Internet account sharing child pornography online. Comcast identified the account subscriber as Jennie Reynolds at 309 South 23rd Street in San José. The police obtained a search warrant for the residence, garages, and outbuildings at the address.
While searching Reynolds’ house, the police discovered defendant Kevin Nguyen was living in a separate residence behind the house. The police then searched Nguyen’s residence and found a laptop with child pornography. The trial court found the search overbroad and granted Nguyen’s motion to suppress.
The Attorney General appealed. He contended the warrant expressly authorized the search. He argued the warrant affidavit set forth probable cause to search any residence on the property because anyone on the property could have accessed Reynolds’ computer network wirelessly. Finally, the Attorney General contended the police acted in good faith reliance on the warrant.
The Court of Appeal, per Premo, J., held the police lacked probable cause to search defendant’s residence because they had no basis to believe the suspect network was accessed from defendant’s residence. They further held that the warrant did not expressly authorize the search, and the police lacked good faith reliance on the warrant.
We find no language in the warrant authorizing a search of Nguyen’s residence. The warrant identified “a single story single family residence” to be searched—i.e., the front house on the street, which the warrant described in detail. The warrant makes no mention of Nguyen’s residence. As to the claim his residence was included under the term “garages” in the warrant, the trial court made a factual finding that the rear structure was not “simply a garage” but was “plainly a separate residence.” Under our standard of review, we are bound by the trial court’s finding if it is supported by substantial evidence.
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We hold the police lacked probable cause to search Nguyen’s residence because the police had no basis to believe the network with the suspect IP address was accessed from Nguyen’s residence. The Attorney General contends this rule creates “an unreasonable Catch-22” because the police have no way to ascertain which buildings on a property have access to a given network. The Attorney General asserts this creates “an unduly stringent burden on investigators.” But as the trial court pointed out, the police could have done several things to establish probable cause for a search of Nguyen’s residence. After entering Reynolds’ house, officers could have asked her if she had a wireless network, whether it was password-protected, or whether Nguyen’s residence shared access to the network. If the police had established probable cause to believe Nguyen’s residence held evidence of a crime, they could have obtained a telephonic warrant. Given that Nguyen was held at the Mountain View Police Department during the search, the police had sufficient time to do so.
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[Finally, t]he Attorney General argues the police acted in good faith reliance on the warrant, even if the search exceeded the scope of the warrant. The trial court rejected this claim. The court found the police knew Nguyen’s residence was not a garage before they searched it, and the court found police had no basis to believe his residence had access to the suspect network. The court’s analysis was sound.
Passenger’s Probation Search Condition Leads to Inevitable Discovery of Drugs
• Cervantes, 11 CA5 860, 217 CR3 830 (17)
Offs stopped Def’s car for expired registration. They searched his vehicle after they learned that the adult female riding in the front passenger seat had provided them with a false identity and was subject to a felony warrant and probation search condition.
In the back seat they saw guy stuff: a “men’s toiletries bag” and an opaque bag with guy stuff in it … like boxer shorts. But they also found a baggie with meth.
They then searched the center console and found more of what turned out to be meth. Def. moved to suppress. Denied.
The Court of Appeal, per Haller, J., affirmed.
Def. argued that the Offs should not have searched the men’s items because it was a woman who was subject to the probation search condition. The court, however, stated:
We need not address this specific argument because we agree with the Attorney General that even if Officer Larson had not begun his search with those bags, he would inevitably have discovered the drugs contained in them. That is, Officer Larson was (as we will explain) entitled to search the center console; he undoubtedly would have done so regardless of whether he first discovered drugs in the backseat bags; he would have found the methamphetamine in the center console; and he then would have justifiably searched the rest of defendant’s car and its contents, leading to his inevitable discovery of the drugs in the backseat bags.
See also …
Guzman, 11CA5 184, 217 CR3 509 (17): Def. charged with two counts of of lewd acts upon child under 14. Def. called minor witness to challenge victim testimony. People offered phone call with wit. and vic’s mother to impeach. Supp. Den. Aff. Exclusionary provision of Cal’s Invasion of Privacy Act limited by Prop. 8.