Traffic Stop Prolonged For Dog Sniff Violates 4th

United States Supreme Court

RODRIGUEZ, ___ US ___, 135 SC 1609, ___ LE3 ___ (15) #13-9972

A Nebraska cop, Stuble, pulled over a Mercury Mountaineer for driving on the shoulder. Rodriguez was the driver. After Rodriguez identified himself, Struble asked him why he had driven onto the shoulder. Rodriguez replied that he had swerved to avoid a pothole. Struble then gathered Rodriguez’s license, registration, and proof of insurance, and asked Rodriguez to accompany him to the patrol car. Rodriguez asked if he was required to do so, and Struble answered that he was not. Rodriguez decided to wait in his own vehicle.

After running the documents, Stuble issued a “warning ticket” to Rodriguez. With the purpose of the stop now over, Stuble asked for permission to have a dog sniff the car. Rodriguez refused. Struble then ordered Rodriguez out of the vehicle and to the patrol car. Seven minutes later a deputy sheriff with a drug sniffing dog. Struble led the dog around the car and, Bark!, the dog alerted. The cops recovered a big bag of meth.

The United States Supreme Court, 6-3, holds that this is a violation of the 4th Amendment.

The issue is simple: once the purpose of traffic stop has been satisfied, is the detainee free to go? Or can the police get away with a “slight” delay in order to conduct further investigation?

From the majority opinion by Justice Ginsburg:

Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s “mission”—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop…Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may “last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.”

Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissented. Ginsburg addressed one point Alito brings up:

An officer, in other words, may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. But contrary to JUSTICE ALITO’s suggestion, … he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.

California Court of Appeal

Wiretap of Cell Phone Valid

Sedillo, 235 CA41037,185 CR3 907 (15)

Defendant was convicted of five counts of attempted murder and one count of shooting at an inhabited dwelling. The convictions arose out of a gang-related shooting in 1992. The actual shooter, was convicted in 1995 of murder and attempted murder. Defendant was the driver of the getaway car, and although witnesses identified defendant from a photo array, no witness was able to identify defendant at a live lineup, and as a result, defendant was not charged in connection with the crime. In 2010, a wiretap of defendant’s phone in an unrelated matter recorded statements in which defendant admitted her involvement in the December 1, 1992 murder, and in May 2010, defendant was charged in connection with the shooting.

On appeal, Defendant challenged the validity of the wiretap of her cell phone.

The Court of Appeal, per Johnson, J., affirmed.

A wiretap must be supported by a finding of probable cause, necessity, and minimization. A trial court’s determination that the documentation supporting the wiretap authorization application is sufficient is entitled to substantial deference and is reviewed for abuse of discretion.