Steele, ___ CA4 ___, 201 CR3 363 (16) # C077040:
Deputy sheriffs observed two vehicles traveling together. The lead vehicle was a dark colored SUV. The second was a white Jeep.
The deputies followed the two vehicles to a rural dead end road with no streetlights. They ran a check on the license plates. Dispatch informed the deputies that there was a felony arrest warrant for the registered owner of the lead vehicle. The deputies decided to conduct an enforcement stop on the lead vehicle based on the expired registration and the arrest warrant. They were not aware of any Vehicle Code violations associated with the second vehicle.
The deputies activated their emergency lights. Under People v. Brown, 61 C4 968, 972 (15), this is a detention because a reasonable person under the circumstances would not have felt free to leave.
The deputies approached the second vehicle, the Jeep, first, for “officer safety.” As one deputy testified, “As law enforcement officers, we are not going to walk past a vehicle in the middle of the night with a subject in it.”
Def was in the driver’s seat of the Jeep. Upon approach, a deputy smelled marijuana wafting forth. They asked Def to exit the vehicle. They found a bag of marijuana and two baggies of methamphetamine.
Def. moved to suppress. Denied. The Court of Appeal, per Mauro, J., affirmed.
Yes, this was a detention per Brown. But the facts in this case had a justification.
Here, as in Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th 354, Maryland v. Wilson, supra, 519 U.S. 408, and Taylor, supra, 41 P.3d 681, the initial approach of the deputies to defendant’s vehicle was not for the purpose of arresting defendant or for an investigation directed at him. The deputies stopped the lead vehicle for an expired registration and a felony arrest warrant. (People v. Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1135 [officer may stop a vehicle and detain a driver when there is articulable and reasonable suspicion that an automobile is not registered].) They did not have any information that defendant’s vehicle violated the Vehicle Code. However, while attempting to complete a lawful detention of the lead vehicle, the deputies were forced to either contact defendant because his vehicle was parked directly behind the lead vehicle or walk past defendant’s vehicle without knowing whether the occupants of that vehicle might pose a danger to the deputies.
The circumstances warranted caution by the deputies. It was dark. The deputies were at the end of a driveway, not visible from the highway. The lead and second vehicles appeared to be travelling together and the deputies did not know the identities of the drivers. There was a risk defendant could come up behind the deputies while they contacted the lead vehicle. As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, “traffic stops are ‘especially fraught with danger to police officers.’ [Citation.] ‘ “The risk of harm to both the police and the occupants [of a stopped vehicle] is minimized,” ’ . . . ‘ “if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation.” ’ ” (Arizona v. Johnson (2009) 555 U.S. 323, 330-331 [172 L.Ed.2d 694, 702] [also stating an officer is not constitutionally required to give the passenger of a stopped vehicle an opportunity to depart the scene after exiting a vehicle without first ensuring that, in so doing, she was not permitting a dangerous person to get behind her]; see Brendlin v. California (2007) 551 U.S. 249, 258 [168 L.Ed.2d 132, 140] [it is reasonable for passengers to expect that a police officer at the scene of a crime, arrest, or investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize the officer’s safety].) Officer safety is a weighty public interest warranting a brief detention of defendant to assure that defendant did not present a danger to the deputies while they approached and investigated the lead vehicle and its occupants.
Police Can Lie About Basis of Auto Stop if the Stop is Objectively Reasonable
Magallon-Lopez, 817 F3 671 (9 Cir. 16):
Officers investigating an interstate drug-trafficking ring learned through wiretap intercepts that a shipment of methamphetamine would be traveling by car from Washington to Minnesota. The vehicle would have Washington plates. They stopped a Volkswagen Passat en route in Montana; the car belonged to appellant Hector Magallon- Lopez, who was driving. Although the officer had not observed any traffic violations, he told Magallon-Lopez that the reason for the stop was Magallon- Lopez’s failure to signal properly before changing lanes. The officer knew this was not the real reason for the stop, but he did not want to disclose at that point the true nature of the investigation.
A drug sniffing dog was brought to the scene and hit on the car, which was then seized. Two pounds of meth under the trunk.
Def. moved to suppress. Not because of lack of reasonable suspicion to stop, but because the officer lied about the reason for the stop.
No dice, says the court:
That the officer lied about seeing Magallon-Lopez make an illegal lane change does not call into question the legality of the stop. The standard for determining whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion exists is an objective one; it does not turn either on the subjective thought processes of the officer or on whether the officer is truthful about the reason for the stop. If, for example, the facts provide probable cause or reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop, the stop is lawful even if the officer made the stop only because he wished to investigate a more serious offense. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812–13 (1996). Likewise, if the facts support probable cause to arrest for one offense, the arrest is lawful even if the officer invoked, as the basis for the arrest, a different offense as to which probable cause was lacking. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153–55 (2004); United States v. Ramirez, 473 F.3d 1026, 1030–31 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2007).
Search of Student’s Cell Phone Was Justified
In re Raphael C., 245 CA4 1288, 200 CR3 305 (16) #A143376
Firearm and magazine found in trash can on high school campus. Administrators suspected Minor’s involvement, and in the course of questioning him, they seized and searched his cell phone.
Interspersed with the text messages on the phone were a number of digital images, including a photograph of Minor holding what appeared to be the firearm found on campus. When the prosecution sought to use these images as evidence in the proceeding below, Minor unsuccessfully moved to suppress them.
The juvenile court found Minor had possessed an assault weapon, and it declared him a ward of the juvenile court.
Suppression denied. The Court of Appeal, per Jones, P.J., affirmed.
Here, school officials were confronted by a situation in which a loaded firearm had been discovered on school property. They were concerned Minor could be using his cell phone to communicate with students who might possess another firearm or weapon the officials did not know about. In these circumstances, “ ‘[t]he special need for an immediate response to behavior that threatens . . . the safety of schoolchildren and teachers . . . justifies the Court in excepting school searches from the warrant and probable-cause requirement, and in applying a standard determined by balancing the relevant interests.’ ” (In re J.D., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 715, quoting T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. at p. 353 (conc. opn. of Blackmun, J.).)